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THE DIVERSITY RATIONALE: UNPROVABLE,
UNCOMPELLING
Brian N Lizotte*
Student body diversity-and the purported educational benefits diversity bestows-
is the final Supreme Court-endorsed justification for affirmative action by public
universities. Are the benefits of diversity indeed "substantial," as the Grutter
majority claimed? The author analyzes the social scientific research upon which the
Court relied in articulating the diversity interest. By critiquing its theory and
methodology, the author shows how the research fails to prove educational benefits;
and by considering the logic underlying social science generally, he shows how the
causal relationship is, technically, not provable. The author questions, then, how
the diversity interest can possibly be compelling.
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INTRODUCTION
Student body diversity is now endorsed by a Supreme Court major-
ity as a compelling state interest-generating unique educational
benefits-for which a public university may strive by means of a narrowly
tailored affirmative action program.' Grutter and Gratz affirm Justice Pow-
el's solitary but determinative acceptance in Bakke of the use of race by
the University of California to attain a diverse student body.2 Indeed, the
supposed educational benefit of diversity is now the only permissible basis
for racial preferences in college admissions; Bakke became a "shibboleth,"
3
foreclosing corrective and equal access justifications.4
In Bakke, Powell recognized a university's right to "select those stu-
dents who will contribute the most to the 'robust exchange of ideas,'" a
goal of "paramount importance in the fulfillment of [the university's] mis-
sion." ' A diverse enrollment was intended to create an atmosphere "'most
1. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003).
2. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311 (1978). Several appeals
courts rejected Powell's lone-authored opinion as binding precedent. Johnson v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F3d 1234, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e do not believe
that Justice Powell's opinion is binding[.]"); Hopwood v. Tex., 78 F3d 932, 944 (5th Cir.
1996) ("Justice Powell's view in Bakke is not binding precedent on this issue. While he
announced the judgment, no other Justice joined in that part of the opinion discussing the
diversity rationale.").
3. John H. Bunzel, The Diversity Dialogues in Higher Education, 29 FosRD-AM URB.
L.J. 489, 500 (2001).
4. In his separate Bakke opinion,Justice Marshall warned of the chilling effect that
Powell's foreclosure would entail. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 399 (Marshall, J., separate opinion)
("As we have observed, '[a]ny other approach [than remediation] would freeze the status
quo that is the very target of all desegregation processes.' ") (quoting McDaniel v. Barresi,
402 U.S. 40, 41 (1971)). See Charles R. Lawrence Il, Two Views of the River:A Critique of
the Liberal Defense of Affirnative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 928, 931 (2003) ("[A]s diversity
has emerged as the dominant defense of affirmative action in the university setting, it has
pushed other, more radical substantive defenses to the background.").




conducive to speculation, experiment, and creation: ,6 preparing students,
in turn, to live in a diverse society Powell claimed, "[O]ur tradition and
experience lend support to the view that the contribution of diversity is
substantial."7 Powell confined his argument to "tradition and experience,"
offering no formal data to support his expostulation.
In the years between Bakke and Grutter/Gratz, the Court clarified its
affirmative action jurisprudence in two ways. First, the Court, through
three opinions written by Justice O'Connor, crystallized a single, strict
scrutiny standard for all racial classifications, even those having a suppos-
edly benign purpose. Following her concurrence in Wygant (sharing in
"the belief, apparently held by all Members of this Court, that racial clas-
sifications of any sort must be subjected to 'strict scrutiny" however
defined"),8 three years later, O'Connor expanded her defense of a singular
strict scrutiny standard in the Croson majority opinion;9 and finally, in
1995's Adarand Constructors, she answered firmly any doubt lingering post-
Croson by asserting, "[W]e hold today that all racial classifications, imposed
by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed
by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny."
10
Having firmly established a strict scrutiny standard, the Court next
winnowed away the remedial justification for affirmative action. Justice
Brennan had originally argued in his separate Bakke opinion that affirma-
tive action was an appropriate policy response to correct for the broad
history of discrimination in American society." However, that view was
never shared by a Court majority, and in CrosonJustice O'Connor explic-
itly rejected the broad societal theory, holding that affirmative action was
permissible only as a remedy for specifically identified, purposeful dis-
crimination by a particular actor, and only for those particular groups
who had experienced the discrimination. Thus, a school that could not,
or was unwilling to, show that it had previously discriminated against par-
ticular racial groups was now left with only one justification for
employing racial preferences in its admissions decisions: the educational
6. Id. at 312 (quoting Sweezy v. N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in result)).
7. Id. at 313.
8. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 285-86 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
9. City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
10. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,227 (1995).
11. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 325 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) ("Government may take race into account when it acts not to demean
or insult any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial
prejudice."); id. at 362 ("[The University's] articulated purpose of remedying the effects of
past societal discrimination is, under our cases, sufficiently important to justify the use of
race-conscious admissions programs where there is a sound basis for concluding that mi-
nority underrepresentation is substantial and chronic[.]").
12. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
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benefits of diversity. But Justice O'Connor rejected even this "too amor-
phous, too insubstantial" interest,13 at least until 2003.
Grutter and Gratz finally took on the diversity rationale directly,
striving to imprint Bakke's hunch about the educational benefits of diver-
sity with actual social scientific evidence. Although deferring to the
University of Michigan Law School's "educational judgment that such
diversity is essential to its educational mission" 14-a generous deferral-
the Grutter Court concluded in its own right, based on evidence provided
by amici curiae, that "the educational benefits that diversity is designed to
produce ... are substantial."'5 So definitive a statement proclaims the di-
versity rationale as fact, certifying Justice Powell's tempered words.
16
Justice O'Connor's reliance on social science departs from her past warn-
ing that "[s]ocial scientists may debate how peoples' thoughts and
behavior reflect their background, but the Constitution provides that the
Government may not allocate benefits and burdens among individuals
based on the assumption that race or ethnicity determines how they act
or think.' 7 Nonetheless, in Grutter, she finds that diversity, by itself 1) cre-
ates cross-racial understanding; 2) breaks down racial stereotypes; 3)
generates classroom discussion that is "'livelier, more spirited, and simply
more enlightening and interesting' "; and 4) prepares students for the
workforce and society.'8
13. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FC.C., 497 U.S. 547,612 (1990) (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
Accord Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 ("Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic
harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote no-
tions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.") (emphasis added) (citing
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298).
14. Gnitter, 539 U.S. at 328. This deference is grounded in a university's academic
freedom, protected by the First Amendment. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 ("Academic freedom,
though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a spe-
cial concern of the First Amendment. The freedom of a university to make its own
judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body."). Could not "aca-
demic freedom" also be used to justify a university's decision to admit only White students,
in service of sincerely-held ideological and pedagogical beliefs concerning White suprem-
acy? Charles R. Lawrence III, Each Other's Harvest: Diversity's Deeper Meaning, 31 U.S.E L.
Riv. 757,770-71 & nn.70-74 (1997). Seemingly not. Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that the IRS may deny tax-exempt status to private schools
who practice racial discrimination, but who would otherwise qualify for an exemption.
Bob Jones University is dedicated to teaching fundamentalist Christian religious beliefs,
and was, consistent with these beliefs, discriminating against non-White students in admis-
sions. The Court held that there was an overriding government interest in eradicating
racial discrimination that outweighed the university's free exercise of religion). "Academic
freedom" is apparently handcuffed when it resists rather than promotes racial diversity.
15. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. Twelve expert witnesses in Gratz and fourteen in Grutter
testified on the costs and benefits of considering race in admissions. Several amici briefs are
available at http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
16. See supra, text accompanying note 7.
17. Metro Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. at 602 (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
18. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 244a, 246a).
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This Note confronts the social scientific research upon which the
Grutter Court relied in articulating that a diverse student body yields edu-
cational benefits. By criticizing its theory and methodology, I show how
the research fails to prove educational benefits; and by considering the
logic underlying social science generally, I show how the causal relation-
ship is, technically, not provable. Social science can only speak to what
might be true. Ultimately, then, the diversity interest is an unstable founda-
tion for affirmative action policy-certainly not compelling.
I. SOCIAL SCIENCE: LOGIC AND ROLE IN EQUAL PROTECTION LAW
Social science is grounded in probability, not deductive logic. Social
scientists provide evidence of an effect only by ruling out the possibility
that there is no effect. Consider a hypothetical researcher who finds that
Black students at colleges with minority populations exceeding 40%
score, on average, 155 points on the LSAT, while Black students at col-
leges with minority populations below 40% score only 148 points. She
reports with "95% confidence" that being educated alongside a diverse
student body improves Black students' LSAT performance. This conclu-
sion is inaccurate in two important ways.
First, complementary to her 95% confidence is a 5% chance of error.
Social scientists do not prove the truth of a proposition; instead, they indi-
rectly show that a proposition is likely by showing that a competing "null"
hypothesis is unlikely. In the example, the researcher would ask, "What is
the chance, given the null hypothesis that student body diversity does not
affect Black students' LSAT scores, that, in my particular sample, I would
actually find a seven point advantage for Black students educated along-
side a more diverse student body?" The question is cumbersome, but the
answer is simple: 5%. That is, the researcher reasons that it is sufficiently
unlikely (only 5%) that she would find a seven point difference in her
sample if the true population difference were zero, '9 so she infers (but does
not prove) that campus diversity has a genuine effect on Black students'
LSAT scores.
This is the best she can do; she can never be certain. A critic's job is
comparatively easy,20 because there is always some chance the seven-point
difference was due to random chance, unrelated to diversity. Given the
19. A "population" is the set of all people possessing a given characteristic; here, all
Black college students worldwide who take the LSAT. A "sample" is the subset of the
population that a researcher actually studies. From conclusions reached by studying her
sample directly, a researcher makes inferences about the population in general.
20. E.g., Crystal G. Muhammad, Data Matters: Making a Compelling Case for Di-
versity in Education 22 (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University ofVirginia) (on
file as UMI Microform 3091141 with ProQuest Information and Learning Company, Ann
Arbor, MI) (complaining that social scientific studies are difficult to conduct but easy to
criticize).
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impossibility of proof by social science, the Grutter majority's proclama-
tion that "the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce ...
are substantial",2' is not phrased with requisite caution. The Court pro-
claimed a compelling interest in the benefits of student body diversity
only by relying on evidence that it is unlikely diversity has no effect.
Worse, the evidence came from methodologically suspect research.
A second problem for my hypothetical researcher is that, even if she
could be 100% certain of a genuine difference in Blacks' LSAT scores
between more and less diverse schools, such a finding would explain
nothing about how, why, or even if diversity caused the difference. Studies
that take student samples as they find them-neither randomly selecting
students from a larger population nor randomly assigning them to treat-
ment conditions-can only detect correlations, not causation. It is always
possible to "explain away" a correlation. For instance, schools with large
endowments may be able to afford both greater diversity through gener-
ous financial assistance, and richer educational opportunities through
opulent resources. Then, the seven point advantage in my hypothetical
might be a pure resource effect, with no role played by campus diversity.
To infer that diversity causes an educational benefit, one would need to
randomly select hundreds or thousands of Black students, randomly assign
one half to an all-Black school and the other half to a racially heteroge-
neous school, and extensively control other extraneous variables on each
campus for four years, in order to isolate a diversity effect. It is unsurpris-
ing that no such study has been performed, and unlikely one ever will be
performed.
Numerous scholars have argued against using social science to de-
cide equal protection claims.2 z First, they argue that courts, by relying on
social science, demean the moral principle embodied in the Fourteenth
24Amendment. Today, the Grutter Court argues, social science demonstrates
a reliable effect of diversity on educational outcomes.What if, twenty-five
years from now, the social science changes, and the purported educational
benefit of diversity disappears? Would affirmative action suddenly be un-
constitutional?
A related criticism is that it is institutionally inappropriate for judges
to evaluate social science. Because social science is never flawless, judges
act as legislators when they use such evidence to choose a particular side.
21. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
22. See infra note 41.
23. See generally Scott Jaschik, A Valuable Tool or Bias in Reverse?, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUc.,Apr. 28,1995, atAl4.
24. Edmund CahnJurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. Rw. 150, 167 (1955) ("It is one thing
to use the current scientific findings ... in order to ascertain whether the legislature has
acted reasonably" but "quite another thing to have our fundamental rights rise, fall or
change along with the latest fashions of psychological literature."); Deborah J. Merritt, The
Future of Bakke:Will Social Science Matter? 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1055,1056-57 (1998).
[VoL. 11:625
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A federal court may decide whether Congress has acted reasonably in
enacting a law, but a court traditionally does not weigh evidence itself
where its decision will impact similarly situated litigants.25 Many judges
lack backgrounds in economics, sociology, and psychology, and may be
unable to distinguish between methodologically sound and suspect re-
26
search. Judges interpreting social science may base their decisions not in
preexisting legal principles, but in the judges' personal beliefs about the
worthiness of a governmental objective. Indeed, it is impossible to know
whether a court citing social science data is relying on those data as nec-
essary to its decision, or merely as supporting a decision reached on other
grounds.
Two famous Supreme Court cases-Brown v. Board of Education28 and
29Muller v. Oregon -illustrate, in my opinion, the proper versus improper
use of social science data to resolve an equal protection claim. In Muller,
the Court for the first time relied on historical and anthropological data
to justify the proposition that a woman's physical structure and role as
mother "properly placed [her] in a class by herself," dependent on men,
and creating a public health concern justifying limitation of her workday
hours.30 Today, of course, Muller reads as blatantly misogynistic, its "data"
dated and disproved. Social science, by incorporating evolving cultural
norms, is an unstable foundation for policy. The Court's difficulty came in
trying to use social science for something it is ill-equipped to do: prove a
proposition.
In contrast, future generations have embraced that most famous use
of social science in a Supreme Court case, the evidence cited in Brown 31 to
25. Muhammad, supra note 20, at 29-30 (calling "most controversial"judges' "legis-
lative use of social science to create new law ... applicable to every similarly situated set of
plaintiff; and defendants.").
26. J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE, THE SUPREME COURT AND
SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978 32 (1979); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law
and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption From Law and Economics, 88 CAL.
L. Rav. 1051,1093-94 (2000).
27. Robert P George, Gratz and Grutter: Some Hard Questions, 103 COLUM. L. REv.
1634, 1637 (2003) (judges might "vary in their judgments not because of differences of
opinion about law, but purely as a result of ideological differences."); James E. Ryan, The
Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence in Modern Desegregation Cases, 81 N.C. L. R.Ev.
1659, 1676-80 (2003) (observing that judges are susceptible to confirmation bias, inter-
preting evidence in a manner that confirms their initial beliefs, and discounting evidence
that contradicts their beliefs).
28. 347 U.S. 483 (-954).
29. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
30. Id. at 422. The Court relied principally on the "Brandeis Brief," consisting of
two pages of legal reasoning and 100 pages of social scientific research.
31. 347 U.S. at 494-95, n.11. Chief Justice Warren cited seven social scientific au-
thorities, principally KENNETH B. CLARK, EFFECT OF PREJUDICE AND DIsCRIMINATION ON
PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT (Midcentury White House Conference on Children and
Youth, 1950). Muhammad, supra note 20, at 21-22, summarizes critiques of the Clark
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attack Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal" doctrine justifying segrega-
tion.32 The key difference between Brown and Muller is that the Brown
Court used social science to defeat a policy ("separate but equal") by falsi-
fying its assumptions.33 The Muller Court, instead, erred by using social
science to justify a policy (limitations on women's working hours) by es-
tablishing its assumptions. However, a single counterexample (e.g., a
brawny, childless woman) negates the assumptions, causing the general
policy to fail. Consistent with its logic, social science can demonstrate the
falsehood, but never the truth, of a proposition.
By employing social science to articulate a diversity interest justify-
ing affirmative action policies, the Grutter Court acted like the Muller
Court, basing its decision necessarily on falsifiable evidence. I now turn to
that evidence.
II. DIVERSITY RATIONALE: EVIDENCE BEFORE GRUTTER
Until the drive produced by the Michigan cases, there was little em-
34pirical research on educational outcomes related to affirmative action.
study, including that the study used too small a sample, failed to control for Blacks' geo-
graphical migration patterns during the 1930s and 1940s, ignored the effects of question
sequencing, and overstated its own results.
32. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In Plessy, the Court upheld a Louisiana statute used to
eject a U.S. citizen of 1/8 African and 7/8 Caucasian heritage from a first class railroad car.
The Court protected the liberty of the Louisiana General Assembly to crystallize social
norms, to "act with reference to the established usages, customs, and traditions of the peo-
ple, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort." Id. at 550.
33. Several authors argue that moral principle, not social science, drove the Brown
decision. RicHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 706 (1975) ("Then [Warren] added, by way of
stressing that the sociology was merely supportive and not the substance of the holding, 'It
was only a note, after all."'); Muhammad, supra note 20, at 4 ("For Warren, the moral prin-
ciple of equality dictated desegregation, without regard for the judicial means to arrive at
that end. ... [T]he scholarship of legal historians as well as Warren's own footnote refer-
ence to the Clark evidence suggest that the research was not central to his reasoning.").
James Ryan writes:
[l]t is difficult to reconcile the notion that social science evidence was de-
terminative in Brown with the fact that the Court relied on its decision in
Brown, and nothing more, to outlaw segregated golf courses, buses, and
beaches.... [A]ccounts of those who drafted the opinion, as well as an un-
derstanding of the political history surrounding the decision, strongly suggest
that the evidence was cited to bolster and obfuscate what was at the time a
fairly controversial normative conclusion that segregation ... was morally
wrong.
Ryan, supra note 27, at 1665-66 (citations omitted). See generally Sanjay Mody, Note, Brown
Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social Science and the Supreme Court's Quest for Legiti-
macy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 793, 811-28 (2002)
34. William C. Kidder, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Recent Developments in
Litigation, Admissions and Diversity Research, 12 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 173, 221 (2001).
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Research was, and continues to be, politicized.3 s In this section, I review
hallmarks in the research preceding Grutter and Gratz, including several
studies whose authors served as expert witnesses in the Grutter and Gratz
trials. The evidence lends itself to multiple interpretations. Such ambiguity
reconciles poorly with a rigid compelling interest standard so strongly
biased against any use of race in government programs.
A. Evidence from Primary and Secondary Schools
In 1998, Maureen Hallinan reviewed "well-designed and well-
executed" studies on the educational benefits of diversity. 6 She does not
elaborate on what it means to be well-designed and executed, except that
the studies were "based on high quality data sets, rely on appropriate re-
search designs, and employ rigorous analytic techniques,"3 7 three vague
criteria. Hallinan limits her focus to the effects of racial diversity. Even
though Grutter urges attention to all types of diversity, it accepts the Law
School's "longstanding commitment to 'one particular type of diversity,'
that is, 'racial and ethnic diversity.' 0s Thus, Hallinan's review is relevant.
Overall, Hallinan concludes, "[W]hile the research reveals a few in-
consistencies, the major results receive wide empirical support" for
diversity's benefit.39 However, the evidence suffers from flaws and ambi-
guities, and can readily be explained by causes separate from diversity.
Importantly, her review contains no randomized, controlled experiment
testing the educational benefits of campus diversity, so it adds nothing to
our knowledge of the causal relationship, if any exists, between the two
variables.
Most of Hallinan's data come from elementary and secondary
schools. She reports that Black, Latino, and White students all perform
better academically in majority White schools than in minority White
schools. 4° But this finding is hardly reducible to an effect of diversity, and
is more easily explained in terms of systematic differences in resources
available to majority White versus minority White schools, and the
Most inquiries into the educational benefits of diversity focused on elementary and sec-
ondary schools, making suspect any generalization to college populations, who are the
more likely subjects of affirmative action policy.
35. E.g., Ryan, supra note 27, at 1675 ("[A] number of social scientists studying
desegregation seem precommitted to particular findings. One can often predict the con-
clusions of a report based on the identity of the author.").
36. Maureen T. Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence,
59 OHio ST. L.J. 733,741 (1998).
37. Id. at 753.
38. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316 (quoting the Law School's admissions policy). But see
infra notes 102-108 and accompanying text.
39. Hallinan, supra note 36, at 741.
40. Id. at 741-42.
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disparate educational opportunities these resources create. Where a
handful of Black students are performing well in a wealthy school along-
side a thousand high-performing White students, it would be silly (and
possibly insulting) to attribute the Black students' achievements to their
diverse educational experience. Hallinan admits, "[I]t is not desegregation
per se that improves achievement, but rather the learning advantages some
desegregated schools provide." 42 Likewise, her observation that Black stu-
dents' elevated achievement corresponds to how early they are placed in
majority White schools43 is more plausibly explained by longer exposure
to a lion's share of resources than by the effects of integration.
Next, Hallinan observes that cooperative learning techniques are
shown to increase achievement of all students in racially heterogeneous
groups." Here, it is impossible to separate the effect of a racially heteroge-
neous group from the effect of cooperative learning endeavors generally.
Cooperative learning may be a successful technique independent of who
is cooperating, and an established cooperative learning program should be
equally successful in a classroom of all White or all Black students.
The most coherent of Hallinan's findings is that "research is fairly
consistent in reporting that black and white students in desegregated
schools are less racially prejudiced than those in segregated schools....
[I]nterracial contact in desegregated schools leads to an increase in inter-
racial sociability and friendship."4  The relationship is intuitive, and,
although not fool-proof, the causal inference between exposure and
friendship seems irrefutable. Whether or not interracial sociability is a
bona fide "educational" benefit is less clear.
B. Evidence from Universities
Studies of the relationship between college student body diversity
and educational benefits are comparatively sparse. Halinan reports one
41. For a recent comprehensive analysis of the high correlation between academic
achievement and family socio-economic status, see SusAN E. MAYER, WHAT MONEY CAN'T
Buy: FAMILY INCOME AND CHILDREN'S LIFE CHANcEs (1997). See also David M. Engstrom,
Civil Rights Paradox? Lawyers and Educational Equity, 10 J.L. & POL'Y 387, 412 (2002) (cita-
tions omitted) (explaining that income and education create "social capital," in turn
improving educational outcomes). State funding inequities are tied to race and socioeco-
nomic status. Tom Owens & Jeffery Maiden, A Comparison of Interschool and Interdistrict
Funding Equity in Florida, 24 J. oF EDUC. FIN. 503 (1999).Teachers flock from impoverished
urban schools with low concentrations of White students to wealthier suburban districts
with high concentrations of White students. Leanna Stiefel et al., Intra-District Equity in
Four Large Cities: Data, Methods, and Results, 23J. OF EDUC. FIN. 447 (1998).
42. Hallinan, supra note 36, at 744.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 745.
[VOL. 11:625
The Diversity Rationale
study46 showing an advance in "cognitive development" among students
enrolled in a college course on multiculturalism, and a second study47
showing that White students enrolled in a college diversity course "in-
crease their understanding of the concept of race." Unfortunately, both
studies were presented at a national conference and are unpublished; Hal-
linan describes them no further. On the surface, the findings are
meaningless. In theory, all education is directed toward some "cognitive
development," and Hallinan reports no unique benefit from the multicul-
tural content of a course. Further, the observation that students exposed
to multiculturalism through course work increase their racial understand-
ing is virtually redundant, akin to observing that students who take
mathematics classes learn mathematics. Indeed, the most resilient conclu-
sion from Hallinan's meta-analysis of college studies is that there is no
evidence suggesting that diversity impairs the achievement of either White
or minority students.48 Hardly compelling.
The Shape of the River,49 the famous work by William Bowen and
Derek Bok-who served as expert witnesses in Gratz and Grutter, respec-
tivelys'-used the Andrew W Mellon Foundation's College and Beyond
database to track students who had enrolled in 28 elite colleges and uni-
versities, 70% at one of 24 private universities, and the other 30% at one
of four large public schools. The study focused on long-term outcomes-
students were surveyed first in 1976, and again in 1989-including
advanced degree attainment, employment, earnings, job satisfaction, civic
participation, and views on race relations.
I rely on the excellent summary by William Kidder' to report Bo-
wen and Bok's findings. Several findings relate to interracial sociability.
57% of Blacks and 46% of Whites in the 1976 sample perceived the "abil-
ity to work effectively and get along well with people from different
races/cultures" as important, with percentages that had improved to 70%
46. Id. at 748 (discussing Maurianne Adams &Yu-Hui Zhou-McGovern, The Socio-
moral Development of Undergraduates in a "Social Diversity" Course: Developmental Theory,
Research, and Instructional Applications (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Ameri-
can Educational Research Association, New Orleans, LA (1994)).
47. Id. at 749 (discussing Thomas R. Bidell et al., Developing Conceptions of Racism
Among Young White Adults in the Context of Cultural Diversity Coursework (paper presented at
the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, New Orleans, LA
(1994)).
48. Id. at 747.
49. WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CON-
SEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1998).
50. Expert report of William Bowen, Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 E Supp. 2d 811,
No. 97-75321 (E.D. Mich. 2000), available at http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/
legal/expert/bowen.html; expert report of Derek Bok, Grutter v. Bollinger, 16 E Supp. 2d
797, No. 97-75928 (E.D. Mich. 1998), available at http://www.umich.edu/-urel/
admissions/legal/expert/bok.htmIl.
51. Kidder, supra note 34, at 222-23 & nn.309-22.
SPRING 2006]
Michigan journal of Race & Law
of Blacks and 63% of-Whites by 1989.2 The 1989 cohort reported a mod-
erate level of interracial interaction, with 88% of Blacks and 56% of
Whites saying they knew well at least two students from the other 
race. 3
Academically, the study found that 75% of Blacks and 81% of Latinos in
the 1989 cohort had graduated within six years from the same college
they had entered, and an additional 4% of Blacks and 9% of Latinos had
transferred and graduated elsewhere. These rates contrasted with 40%
Black and 59% White national graduation rates at large universities. 4 40%
of Blacks in the 1976 cohort had obtained doctorates or professional de-
grees, compared to only 8% nationally.
The Shape of the River suffers from many methodological defects, de-
fects repeated by the amici curiae researchers upon whom the Grutter
Court principally relied. As such, I defer discussion of the flaws until after
I have presented the amici curiae research.
C. Contrary Research
Many studies have found that increased student body diversity is un-
related to educational outcomes, even associated with negative outcomes.
56
Justice Thomas relied on such research in his Grutter dissent. One re-
viewer5 7 lamented the inconsistent findings regarding the effect of
desegregation on the academic achievement of primary and secondary
students; another study8 found that diversity neither harmed nor bene-
fited college students' academic performance. Louise Bohr and
colleagues 9 found no significant reading, mathematics, or critical thinking
test score differences between Black students educated in two historically
Black colleges, versus those educated in sixteen predominantly White col-
52. Id. at 222-23 (quoting BOWEN & BOK, supra note 49, at 220-21). Perhaps it is
troubling that these rates are not substantially higher than 50%.
53. Id. at 223 (citing BOWEN & BOK, supra note 49, at 231-34). The likelihood of
Whites knowing well at least two Blacks grew with the percentage of Blacks in a student
body, and those Whites who knew well at least two Blacks in college were more likely to
know at least two Blacks after college. Of course, this first finding sounds like an accident
of availability, and I wonder whether the two Blacks that Whites knew well after college
were different than the two they knew during college.
54. Id. at 222 & nn.309-10 (citing BOWEN & BOK, supra note 49, at 56-57 & fig. 3.1).
55. Id. at 222 (citing BOWEN & BOK, supra note 49, at 98 fig. 4.2).
56. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 364-65 (Thomas,J., dissenting).
57. DAVID ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 59-116
(1995).
58. Harry Holzer & David Neumark, Assessing Affirmative Action, 38 J. oF ECON.
LITERATuE 483 (2000).
59. Louise Bohr et al., Do Black Students Learn More at Historically Black or Predomi-
nantly White Colleges? 36 J. OF C. STUDENT DEy. 75, 77-79 (1995).
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leges; and another study6° using the same data set found that the Black
students at the historically Black colleges actually scored higher on the
writing skills test. A final study6 found that college retention for both
Blacks and Whites diminished with increasing campus diversity.
Switching to social outcomes, several studies found that increased
student body diversity was correlated with greater conflict between dif-
ferent-raced students. Laboratory studies have shown that contact
between different-raced students does not necessarily foster intergroup
relationships, and instead often spurs interracial antagonism 2 Similarly,
one study63 found that increased diversity was associated with increased
racial insularity in housing, social activities, customs and beliefs.
Several studies have exposed a distaste for affirmative action and di-
versity among both college students and faculty. A sizeable survey of 1,600
college students and 2,400 faculty64 found that higher proportions of
Blacks or Latinos in a student body were associated With less satisfaction
with one's education and the work ethic of one's peers, as well as more
frequent claims of discrimination. 85% of students surveyed, including
71% of minority students, rejected racial preferences in admissions. An-
other survey65 found that a majority of 800 university faculty opposed
affirmative action. Finally, Black law students appear to value diversity
more than do White students.66
Of course, much like a positive correlation between diversity and
educational achievement does not imply that diversity caused such
achievement, a negative correlation between diversity and educational
outcomes does not imply that diversity is to blame. Nonetheless, contrary
research illuminates a diversity counter-rationale, or at least creates suspi-
cion of the diversity rationale. If racial diversity breeds interracial
understanding and cooperation at one school, is it so hard to believe that
it might breed antagonism at another? If you doubt that diversity actually
60. Ernest T. Pascarella et al., Influences on Students' Openness to Diversity and Challenge
in the First Year of College, 67 J. OF HIGHER EDUC. 174 (1996).
61. Mitchell J. Chang, Racial Diversity in Higher Education: Does a Racially Mixed
Student Population Affect Educational Outcomes? (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
UCLA) (on file with UMI Dissertation Services).
62. LEIGH THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR 188-219 (2000).
See also Nancy E. Dowd et al., Diversity Matters: Race, Gender, and Ethnicity in Legal Educa-
tion, 15 U. FLA.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 11, 27 (2003) (survey of 300 University of Florida Law
School students).
63. Chang, supra note 61.
64. Stanley Rothman et al., Does Enrollment Diversity Improve University Education?,
15 INT'L J. OF PUB. OPINION Ras. 8 (2003).
65. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SCHOLARS, NATIONAL FACULTY SURVEY REGARDING
THE USE OF SEXUAL AND RACIAL PREFERENCES IN HIGHER EDUCATION (1996), available at
http://www.nas.org/reports/roper/exsum.htm.
66. Dowd et al., supra note 62, at 27.
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depresses Black students' writing skill, should you not also be skeptical
that diversity improves their critical thinking skill?
III. Amici CURIAE BRIEFS INSTRUMENTAL TO THE GRUTTER DECISION
The briefs by amici curiae in support of the University of Michigan
were enormously influential to the Grutter decision.67 In this section, I
review the evidence from the two briefs that most swayed the Grutter
Court in articulating the compelling interest in the educational benefits
of diversity. These briefs were submitted by 1) the American Educational
Research Association, the Association of American Colleges and Universi-
68
ties, and the American Association for Higher Education 68 [hereinafter,
"Education Brief"]; and 2) high-ranking former generals, admirals, and
civilian leaders of the United States Military69 [hereinafter, "Military
Brief"]. I analyze the Education Brief in particular detail, preparing for
my discussion in the final section of this Note of the theoretical and
methodological weaknesses of the research the brief advances. I also out-
line the arguments advanced by the Military Brief and explain how these
arguments are theoretical only, offering no testable hypothesis to demon-
strate diversity's educational benefit. Where the diversity interest cannot
be verified, it should not be compelling.
A. Education Brief
Grutter and Gratz relied principally on the Education Brief to con-
clude that a diverse student body has educational benefits. The brief, in
turn, relies on an expert report by Patricia Gurin,70 a Professor at the
67. Neal Devins, Explaining Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. Rv. 347, 366-68
(2003) (noting how, across Grutter and Gratz, 83 amicus briefs supported the University, but
only 19 supported petitioners; how 124 members of the House of Representatives, 13
Senators, 23 states, and 91 colleges and universities joined briefs supporting the University,
but no Congressman, only Florida State, and no college or university supported petition-
ers); George, supra note 27, at 1635 (the diversity rationale "was urged on the Court in the
most impassioned terms by people and institutions of enormous prestige and influence.").
68. Brief of American Educational Research Association et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
69. Consolidated Anicus Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W Becton, Jr. et al., Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
70. Expert Report of Patricia Gurin, Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 E Supp. 2d 811 (E.D.
Mich. 2000) (No. 97-75321) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 16 E Supp. 2d 797 (E.D. Mich.
1998) (No. 97-75928), reprinted in 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 363 (1999), and available at
http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/expert/gurintoc.html (last visited Mar. 10,
2006). For clarity of pinpoint citations, I refer hereinafter to the pagination from the re-
print in the Michigan Journal of Race and the Lawe, but said journal did not reprint the five
appendices, so I identify such references only by appendix letter ("A" through "E"), and
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University of Michigan, submitted into evidence by the Law School in
Grutter and by the undergraduate College in Gratz. The report was pre-
pared specifically in anticipation of the Grutter and Gratz litigations.
The brief argues that student body diversity promotes learning, de-
mocratic values, and civic engagement, and prepares students for a diverse
society, workforce, and clientele. The brief also indicates mechanisms
whereby diversity supposedly improves the educational experience. Stu-
dent body diversity is thought to create diverse classrooms that "challenge
students to consider alternative viewpoints and to develop tolerance for
differences," promoting the development of "critical thinking skills.",
7
1
Gurin analyzed three sources of data. The largest data set incorpo-
rated surveys from 9,300 students at nearly 200 universities, collected by
the Cooperative Institutional Research Program conducted at UCLA
[hereinafter, "CIRP study"]. Students completed one survey when they
entered college in 1985 and follow-up surveys in 1989 and 1994.72 Sec-
ond, Gurin analyzed data from the Michigan Student Study [hereinafter,
"MSS study"] collected from 1,134 White students and 187 Black stu-
dents who entered the University of Michigan in 1990. Surveys were
administered at the beginning and end of freshmen year, and at the end of
sophomore and senior years. Latinos and other racial minorities were
omitted from the data collection, because of an insufficient sample size.
73
Finally, to study mechanisms whereby diversity might produce educa-
tional benefits, Gurin analyzed data from undergraduates who entered the
University of Michigan in 1990 and enrolled during freshman year in a
class in the Intergroup Relations, Community, and Conflict Program
[hereinafter, "IGRCC study"]. These students participated in a 10-week
dialogue group, designed to help students discern differences and similari-
ties between White and Black students' viewpoints on contested issues;
examine differences in viewpoint within each race; negotiate conflicts aris-
ing in the dialogues; and challenge the groups to find bases for coalition
and joint action. 4 Students were surveyed first as participants in the MSS
study, again after the IGRCC program was completed, and three years
pinpoint citations to these appendices can be verified by reference to the report as avail-
able on the University of Michigan website.
71. Education Brief, supra note 68, at 3.
72. Gurin, supra note 70, app. C. The National Association of Scholars, who submit-
ted amicus briefs in favor of both Barbara Grutter and Jennifer Gratz, criticized CIRP for
denying access to its data set to persons and organizations against affirmative action pro-
grams. See Peter Schmidt, Report Questions Michigan's Defense in Affirmative-Action Lawsuit,
CHRON. OF HIGHER Eouc.,Apr. 13, 2001, at A37.
.73. Gurin, id. app. C.
74. Id. Course content included contemporary analysis of group inequalities in
economic, educational, and political arenas, and associated policies regarding immigration,
bilingual education, affirmative action, sexual harassment, and Middle East peace initia-
tives.
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later at graduation. The study employed a matched-sample control group
of students not in the IGRCC program."
Gurin conceptualized three forms of diversity as independent vari-
ables. First, she used "structural diversity," the mathematical racial
composition of a school's student body. Structural diversity theoretically
produces institutional transformations that create the possibility for "class-
room diversity"-the incorporation of knowledge about diverse groups
into the curriculum-and "informal interactional diversity," the opportu-
nity to interact on campus with students from diverse backgrounds.
Although structural diversity makes the latter two varieties possible, Gurin
credits only classroom and interactional diversity with producing educa-
tional benefits. 6
Synthesizing the results from the three studies, Gurin concludes that
diversity produces both "learning" and "democracy" outcomes. 7 Students
exposed to the most diversity in classroom settings had the "greatest en-
gagement in active thinking processes, growth in intellectual engagement
and motivation, and growth in intellectual and academic skills. 7 8 They
employed "conscious, effortful, deep thinking," in contrast to thinking that
is preconditioned or stereotyped, enabling them to better understand oth-
ers' perspectives and manage conflicts. 7 9 During college, students exposed
to greater diversity were more engaged as citizens and interacted more
with people from different races and cultures. This engagement and inter-
action extended to the five years immediately following college, when
students exposed to greater campus diversity were more likely to partici-
pate in activities serving community and promoting racial understanding,
and were more likely to have cross-racial friendships.8
Some students in the IGRCC study claimed that their undergradu-
ate education affected the way they thought about diversity: 40% of
Blacks, 25% of Asians, and 28% of White students indicated that some
course at Michigan had significantly impacted their views on diversity,
and for 95% of these students, the impact was positive. 81 Unfortunately,
Gurin omits discussion of the troubling fact that, in the IGPCC study,
large majorities of all students apparently indicated that their views had
not been affected by classroom diversity. Further, at least one study em-
ploying the same CIRP database as Gurin found that student racial
diversity did not affect academic outcomes including grades, dropout rates,
75. Id. Gurin does not identify how many students participated in the IGRCC
study.
76. Gurin, 5 MIcH.J. RACE & L. at 376-77.
77. Id. at 365-66.
78. Id. at 365.
79. Id. at 372.
80. Id. at 366.
81. Gurin, supra note 70, app. E.
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and performance on seven standardized tests. Any weak effects were me-
diated and indirect.82
Gurin's report focuses exclusively on undergraduate education. The
Education Brief also discusses, with less detail, three studies on the educa-
tional benefits of diversity in law school. The first consisted of survey data
from 1,820 students at Harvard and Michigan Law Schools, collected
with an 81% response rate using the Gallup Poll, as well as e-mail surveys
from several other elite law schools (with lower response rates).83 Two-
thirds of the students were White. Majorities of students of all races at
each school said diversity enhanced their thinking about problems and
solutions, the way topics were discussed in classes and outside the class-
room, and their ability to work effectively and get along with members of
other races. Conflicts because of racial differences challenged them to re-
think their values, including views regarding the equity of the criminal
justice system, property rights, and contractual rights.84 Overall, 90% of
students from each school reported an overall positive impact of diversity
on their educational experience; and fewer than 1% said that having di-
verse peers had a negative impact on their education."'
The second law school-specific study was a survey of more than
2,000 Michigan Law School alumni (half of whom were racial minorities)
graduating between 1970 and 1996.86 The Education Brief highlights
three findings from the study. First, large proportions of alumni placed
considerable value on the contribution diversity made to their classroom
experiences in law school. Second, twice as many (50%) White male
alumni who had graduated in the 1990s responded positively to diversity
than did White males graduating in each of the previous two decades
(25%), when there were fewer non-White students enrolled. Despite the
growth, such statistics remain discouragingly low. Third, the survey found
that minority alumni were more likely than other alumni to engage in
government and public interest work and to serve individuals of their
own race or ethnicity.87 Of course, this last finding suggests that minorities
educated alongside diverse peers return to a racially insular environment
upon graduation, hardly laudatory of diversity's benefit.
82. ALEXANDERW ASTIN, WHAT MATTERS IN COLLEGE?: FOUR CRITICALYEARS REVIS-
ITED 186-244 (1993).
83. Gary Orfield & Dean Whitla, Diversity and Legal Education: Student Experiences in
Leading Law Schools, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE OF THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION 143 (Gary Orfield & Michal Kurlaender eds., 2001).The study is discussed in the
Education Brief, supra note 68, at 16-18, 21. The survey is summarized by Kidder, supra
note 34, at 226-27 & nn.352-60.
84. Orfield & Whitla, id.
85. Id. at 160-61 (discussed in the Education Brief, supra note 68, at 21).
86. Richard 0. Lempert et al., Michigan's Minority Graduates in Practice: The River
Runs Through Law Schools, 25 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 395 (2000). The study is discussed in the
Education Brief, supra note 68, at 18-19, 21.
87. Id.
SPRING 2006]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
The final law school-specific study reported in the Education Brief,
a survey of 558 law school faculty, was conducted by the Association of
American Law Schools in 1999.88 Faculty supported student body diver-
sity, believing that diversity helps students confront racial stereotypes by
broadening the variety of experiences shared in the classroom. 75% of
faculty felt strongly that having a diverse student body is important to
their law school's mission.
B. Military Brief
The Military Brief caught much of the Justices' attention at oral ar-
gument for Grutter.89 The brief portrays student body diversity as a
compelling government interest necessary (and therefore subsidiary) to its
paramount interest in national security: "Amid submit that the govern-
ment's compelling interest in promoting racial diversity in higher
education is buttressed by its compelling national security interest in a
cohesive military[,]" for," '[i]t is obvious and unarguable that no govern-
mental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation." ,90 Of
course, national security was never an interest advanced by the defendant
Law School.
Nonetheless, the Military Brief describes how racial tensions in the
armed services during the Vietnam War led to violence in the ranks, im-
pairing the ability to fight.91 The tensions created racial polarization and
disciplinary problems, and impeded the flow of information through the
chain of command. According to the brief, the major impediment to or-
der was the lack of minority officers: the armed forces had become a mix
of racially diverse enlisted ranks, commanded by an overwhelmingly
White officer corps. For example, in 1962, only 1.6% of all commissioned
officers were Black. The brief argues that better integration of the ranks
requires better integration of the officer corps.
In pursuit of numerical integration, the military uses affirmative ac-
tion in admissions to its own academies and to the Reserve Officers'
Training Corps (ROTC) scholarship program. Because racial minorities
from highly selective colleges achieve significantly better officer reviews
88. RICHARD A. WHITE, LAW SCHOOL FACULTY VIEWS ON DIVERSITY IN THE CLASS-
ROOM AND THE LAW SCHOOL COMMUNITY (May 2000), available at http://www.aals.org/
statistics/diverse3.pdf. The study is discussed in the Education Brief, supra note 68, at 19-
20.
89. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No.
02-241). Several Justices call on counsel for the petitioner to explain their position that
diversity is not a compelling state interest given the claims put forth in the Military Brief.
Id. at 7-17, 19-22.
90. Military Brief, supra note 69, at 7-8 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307
(1981)).
91. Id. at 6-7,14-17.
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than minorities from less selective colleges, the brief argues that increasing
the number of minority students at selective colleges is essential to in-
creasing the supply of minority officer candidates. 92 In other words,
selective colleges feed the military with intelligent, diverse officers. The
brief argues, "At present, the military cannot achieve an officer corps that
is both highly qualified and racially diverse unless the service academies
and the ROTC use limited race-conscious recruiting and admissions
policies.'"93
The Army, Navy, and Air Force all use race as a factor in recruiting
and admissions.94 The service academies and ROTC set goals for minority
officer candidates, which they pursue by financial and tutorial assistance
and tailored recruitment programs. West Point sets yearly targets for mi-
nority admissions, aiming to "'represent the society we come from. ,9
The Naval Academy targets 7% Blacks and 4% Latinos in its student body,
aiming to achieve the Naval directive of 6% Blacks and 3% Latinos in its
officer inventory. The Air Force Academy does not employ specific targets,
but does give racial preferences: from 1991-1995, 76% of qualified minor-
ity applicants received offers, compared to 51% of White applicants.
Finally, the ROTC, which produces 48% of active duty officers, offers a
substantial number of scholarships at historically Black colleges and at
institutions with high Latino enrollment; and each service's ROTC pro-
gram works to meet its service's goals for commissioning minority
officers. Today, the ranks are better integrated, with almost 40% minority
servicemen and women, including 21.7% Black, 9.6% Latino, 4% Asian,
and 1.2% Native American. 19% of officers are minorities (including 8.8%
Black), an improvement on the past but still proportionately low relative
to minority representation in the ranks.96
At baseline, the military's articulated interest in campus diversity is
motivated only by its interest in having a diverse, qualified applicant pool
available for military service. Elite schools provide the military with a
recruiting pool pre-selected for intelligence. If the feeder schools are also
racially diverse, then other, more difficult and costly recruiting efforts
need not be undertaken. But other methods are available: the military
could expand the scope of its recruitment effort outside of universities, or
increase the frequency of promoting qualified minority candidates from
within; or it could beseech Congress to enact a compulsory service
92. Id. at 27.
93. Id. at 5 (quoted by Gruner, 539 U.S. at 334) (emphasis in original).
94. Id. at 7, 19-21,25, 35-36.
95. Id. at 19 (quoting Adam Clymer, Service Academies Defend Use of Race in their
Admissions Policies, N.Y.TIMES,Jan. 28, 2003, at A17).
96. Id. at 12, 17 (citing U.S. DEP'T oF DEF., STATISTICAL SERIES PAMPHLET No. 02-5,
SEMIANNUAL RACE/ETHNIC/GENDER PROFILE BY SERVICE/RANK OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE & COAST GuARD 4 (2002)).
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program. Relying on intelligent, diverse student bodies at selective col-
leges is convenient, but by no means necessary.
Further, the military is uninterested in student body diversity in and
of itself, or in the educational benefits diversity may yield. Indeed, the
military offers no proof that the diversity at elite schools produces qualified
officers. 7 Diversity at the college level is useful only as a means to a re-
cruiting end. Diverse, intelligent student bodies are constructed by
admitting diverse, intelligent students. Diversity does not create the stu-
dents' intelligence. The military's argument concerns access, not pedagogy.
The racial preferences that the service academies grant to minorities
may themselves be legally justified as a particular remedy for specific,
prior discrimination by the military and its academies. 98 But the Grutter
Court held that student body diversity confers educational benefits. 99 Mi-
nority representation in the military is not an educational benefit.
Furthermore, diversification of the ranks and officer corps may be a com-
pelling interest when such diversity enhances the functioning of the
military and, therefore, national security.1°° However, much like the nar-
row remedial interest, the interest in national security would justify only
affirmative action practiced directly by the military through recruitment,
enlistment and promotion; or affirmative action practiced directly by the
service academies. This interest is also narrow. Where the brief errs is in
extrapolating the interest to all of higher education. The goal of diversify-
ing the military cannot justify racial preferences granted by all public
universities-granted on the military's behalf-when the fraction of uni-
versity students entering an ROTC program, and the fraction of graduates
ultimately entering the military, are necessarily so small.
97. The Military Brief is void of any attempt to empirically measure the relation-
ship between diversity and educational benefit, relying only on assertions. For instance,
while the brief claims that diverse campuses are helpful toward educating future officers to
work with and lead diverse ranks, its authors cite no evidence that diverse campuses actu-
ally have this effect or provide this training. Military Brief, supra note 69, at 28.
98. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 15 and 18.
100. Even this interest is doubtful. The argument relies on an assumption from 1960s
and 1970s data that, absent a diverse corps, racial tensions would resurface, destroying unity
and impeding the ability to fight. See supra text accompanying note 91. However, the mili-
tary offers no evidence that this assumption is valid today, and it is plausible that the
tension, if any, would not be so intense, or that it might be better managed. Today, the
percentage of officers who are minorities (19%) remains less than half the percentage of
servicemen and women who are minorities (40%), supra note 96, yet racial tensions do not
seem to plague a United States military heavily engaged across the world. Is it possible that
only 15% or 10% minority officers would do the trick today? Findings from social science,
after all, are context-dependent and, often, transient.
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IV. DIVERSITY RATIONALE: PROBLEMS OF METHOD AND THEORY
Paul Brest, former Dean of Stanford Law School, advances a theory
of why a diverse classroom is important to legal education:
American legal education is highly interactive, aimed at getting
students to examine the law from all possible perspectives....
Students are pressed to examine even well-settled cases with a
skeptical eye. This process is designed to teach problem-solving
skills and to impart the critical stance characteristic of all good
lawyers. This method of education depends on students bring-
ing diverse perspectives to the classroom. 1
In this final section, I discuss the many flaws in the theory and re-
search linking a facially diverse student body to educational benefits.
Many of the flaws are methodological; by examining closely the research
advanced by the Education Brief, I expose the dubious assumptions made
and errors committed. Other difficulties exist in how the diversity ration-
ale is explained by the Education Brief and by the Court. These
difficulties are broad: can "diversity" be measured? Can its effect on edu-
cational outcomes be modeled and proven? Is that effect reliable and
universal? Can universities meaningfully harness diversity's educational
power?
My answers to these questions are, "No." The diversity rationale, as
applied by the University of Michigan Law School [hereinafter, "Law
School"] and upheld in Grutter, suffers from its simultaneous wish to be
broad and its required narrowness under the microscope of strict scrutiny.
This dichotomy injures the logic. Still, even assuming a lucid theory open
to empirical testing, the research presented in the Education Brief pro-
vided a woefully inadequate test. The Court was wrong to accept a theory
that was not, and cannot be, validated.
For clarity, I categorize the weaknesses below, but one should not
underestimate how much the categories intersect and the defects interact.
The first four criticisms address the difficulty in measuring abstract vari-
ables like "diversity" and "educational benefit," and are followed by an
explanation why the relationships between these variables cannot be val-
idly determined or generalized. I then discuss several prevalent biases in
the research, and I conclude with two demonstrations of how the cheer-
leaders of diversity are not fully committed to the rationale they advance.
101. Paul Brest, Some Comments on Grutter v. Bollinger, 51 DRAKE L. Rv. 683, 683-
84 (2003).
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A. Mismeasurement of the Independent Variable, "Diversity"
To test how diversity affects educational outcomes, it is critical first
to define and measure diversity appropriately and precisely. The Law
School's admissions policy professes to seek multiple varieties of diversity,
not just racial diversity.102 It is this broad sense of diversity that the Grutter
Court requires; but it is this same breadth that renders the interest un-
workable. In the words of one federal court, "[H]ow can a State dole out
race-based preferences when it cannot adequately define the compelling
interest it seeks to serve?"' 0 3 The Court pronounces that diversity is not an
end in itself, but a means to educational benefit. Too many admissions
committees, including the Law School's, interchange these two concep-
tions.
Even assuming there is a compelling interest in strictly racial diver-
sity (both Bakke and Grutter insist there is not), the question arises: diverse
by what standard? Mapping racial composition of a student body onto
composition of the entire country would produce a very different result
than a system reflecting regional variation.1 04 The Law School's admissions
documents refer to 10-17% of total enrollees as a desired goal for African
American, Latino, and Native American students; 105 in the past, classes
having these percentages supposedly helped the Law School achieve "the
kinds of benefits that we associate with racial and ethnic diversity.0
These numbers are arbitrary and lead to further conundrums: should a
biracial student qualify as one-half of a diversity "unit," or a category unto
himself? Do you force identification with the race of one parent and not
102. The policy explains, "[T]here are many possible bases for diversity admissions,"
and special consideration might be given for "an Olympic gold medal, a Ph.D. in physics,
the attainment of age 50 in a class that otherwise lacked anyone over 30, or the experience
of having been aVietnamese boat person." Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 E3d 732,736 (6th Cir.
2002). But the admissions committee made no effort to monitor these types of diversity,
operating only on an ad hoc basis, if at all. In contrast, every day the Law School admissions
director monitored admissions reports classified by race. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F Supp.
2d 821,842 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
103. Tracy v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 59 F Supp. 2d 1314, 1322 (S.D. Ga.
1999).
104. For example, year 2000 Census data show that Michigan's racial composition
differs from that of the nation, consisting of greater proportions of Whites (80.2% in
Michigan, 75.1% across the United States) and Blacks (14.2% versus 12.3%); but a much
smaller proportion of Latinos (3.3% versus 12.5%). http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/26000.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2006).
105. Grutter, 137 E Supp. 2d at 840-41. It is unclear why the Law School limits its
preferences to these three groups. Martin Carcieri argues, "Since diversity/critical mass is
so crucial, substantial preferences for three races are pronounced narrowly tailored to ad-
vance these ends." Martin D. Carcieri, The Sixth Circuit and Grutter v. Bollinger: Diversity
and Distortion, 7 TEX. R-Ev. L. & POL., Fall 2002, at 127, 142 (citation omitted).




the other, or one grandparent and not the other three?107 When we once
again introduce the infinite types of non-racial diversity, the complexity
increases exponentially, and "diversity" is reduced to a "buzzword." John
Bunzel writes, "Diversity has become a universal good presumed to be so
self-evident that it need never be defined or can conveniently be rede-
fined according to the occasion. ' °
Empirically, diversity has been inconsistently measured. One logical
measure is the racial composition of a school. A researcher could, for in-
stance, measure the correlation between any outcome variable and the
percentage of Black students at a school.10 9 The difficulty with this ap-
proach is that racial diversity (let alone diversity in a more general sense)
includes much more than "Blackness."'" 0 If a diversity of viewpoints is
important to a well-rounded education, using Blackness alone as a proxy
for diversity is grossly inadequate.
A broader way to measure diversity, like that employed by the CIPP
study and by most of the studies reviewed by Hallinan,11' is the percentage
of students of color at a school, measured collectively. However, such a
measure is insensitive to differences in viewpoint between and within
racial groups. The imprecision is exacerbated where a study employs a
bivariate measure (e.g., Hallinan's majority-White versus minority-White
schools) that ignores how increasing diversity incrementally affects the
educational experience. A bivariate measure would distinguish meaning-
lessly between a 1,000-student school with 501 White students and one
with 499. To Gurin's credit, she measured campus racial diversity-what
she called "structural diversity"-continuously. Even so, any measure of
107. If so, you create the potential for gaming the system or lying about race to ex-
ploit preferences. See Barbara Lauriat, Trump Card or Trouble? The Diversity Rationale in Law
and Education, 83 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1202 (2003) (arguing that admissions committees
would need to "create specific criteria for each group and require supporting proof of
group membership," which would require accessing and verifying family trees).
108. Bunzel, supra note 3, at 490; id. at 498 ("The term 'diversity' has become a code
word that fails to define precisely what it allegedly exalts and what exactly is to be accom-
plished by those who extol its virtues.") (citation omitted). Another commentator wonders
why there is no push to diversify university faculty to incorporate various racial, political,
and religious viewpoints underrepresented at elite universities. George, supra note 27, at
1636.
109. This was the measure employed by Rothman et al., supra note 64. As separate
independent variables, the authors used the percentage of Black students, of Latino stu-
dents, and of Asian American students.
110. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 ("The diversity that furthers a compelling state
interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial
or ethnic origin is but a single though important element. Petitioner's special admissions
program, focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than further attainment of
genuine diversity.") (emphasis in original).
111. Hallinan, supra note 36, at 740-41.
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sheerly numerical diversity ignores how a school actually harnesses its
diversity to yield educational effects.
' 12
Still, any measure of institutional diversity is preferable to the ridicu-
lous classroom diversity measure that Gurin used in the CIRP and MSS
studies. In the CIRP analysis, a student's exposure to classroom diversity
was a bivariate measure of whether she had ever enrolled in an ethnic
studies course;' 13 and the thrust of the MSS classroom diversity index was
a student's senior year self-report of whether he had ever taken a course
that significantly impacted his views on racial diversity and multicultural-
ism.'
14
These measures are not only misleading, but potentially offensive in
their assumptions. The CIRP measure assumes that ethnic studies courses
are never passive lectures, but always filled with debate and the sharing of
diverse viewpoints. It assumes some degree of the stigma and spokesman-
ship Justice O'Connor has been otherwise careful to avoid."' The measure
also assumes that students enrolled in ethnic studies courses have auto-
matically been exposed to "diversity." Thus, by Gurin's analysis, twenty
White students sitting alone in a classroom have enjoyed a diverse experi-
ence-nay, a diverse educational career-if the course is one in ethnic
studies.Why, then, were racial admissions preferences ever necessary?
The MSS measure is similarly imprecise, as it includes no quantita-
tive, continuous component. A typical college student will take 30, 40, or
more courses across a four-year college career. How is enrollment in one
ethnic studies course a meaningful metric for a student's exposure to
classroom diversity across her entire college career? If God treated Noah
to one day of sunshine, it would be absurd to suggest that Noah enjoyed a
spell of good weather. At the very least, one should consider how much
rainfall Noah endured on the other 39 days and nights. Likewise, if a stu-
dent takes one course in race relations and 39 courses in Classics, it would
be absurd to accept that the student had a diverse education.
In sum, when diversity is measured too generally (e.g., by the pro-
portion of minorities in a student body), no attention is paid to how
individual students interact, or how an institution manages the education
of its students to realize the purported educational benefits of those stu-
dents' diversity. Although structural diversity on campus as a whole might
set the stage for more particularized classroom and interactive diversity,
only the latter two types are theorized to produce educational benefits,
and Gurin presents no evidence that structural diversity actually has such
a trickle-down effect." 6 In contrast, when diversity is measured too nar-
112. See infra Part IVI.
113. Gurin, supra note 70, app. C and 5 MIcH.J. RACE & L. at 382.
114. Id.
115. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319-20; Croson, 488 U.S. at 493; supra note 13.
116. The National Association of Scholars has accused Gurin of being unable to
show clear educational benefits of racial diversity, causing her to exaggerate the benefits of
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rowly (e.g., by enrollment in ethnic studies courses), researchers risk
studying the effects of a proxy far removed from the underlying construct
it seeks to represent. Absent a showing that enrollment in such courses is
meaningfully correlated with any "true" measure of campus diversity, the
proxy is of shallow, if any, worth.
B. Race as an Imperfect Proxy for Viewpoint
A compelling diversity interest logically applies to all brands of di-
versity, not just to a limited number of groups;" 7 but in practice, the Law
School's admissions committee (like most) focuses almost exclusively on
race." 8 If the goal is intellectual diversity, there may be a better case for
privileging factors like age, work experience, or country of origin over
race."9 Moreover, exposure to different cultures, viewpoints, and experi-
ences may sometimes best be served by privileging a White applicant over
a non-White applicant.
There is wide disagreement about how well racial diversity serves as
a proxy for viewpoint diversity,20 but the proxy is inescapably imprecise.
There are at least two reasons why the Law School-and the Court-has
accepted imprecision over a more direct measure of viewpoints. First, di-
rect measurement would present too great an administrative burden.
Applicants would need to share their "viewpoints" by a personal inter-
view or written essay, and admissions officers would need to meaningfully
categorize those viewpoints into pools from which an admissions
"diversity activities," none of which require a diverse student body to occur. Schmidt, supra
note 72.
117. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (ethnic diversity is "only one element in a range of fac-
tors" relevant to attaining a diverse student body). Justice Powell argued that racial
diversity alone is not compelling, per se, and greater breadth is required. Id. at 315, 317-18
(an admissions program must be "flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of
diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on
the same footing for consideration . .
118. See supra note 102.
119. Bunzel, supra note 3, at 500; Lauriat, supra note 107, at 1184 & n.99 (arguing
that increasing the number of international students rather than domestic minority stu-
dents would be more effectivc in preparing students for a global marketplace).
120. E.g., Grutter, 288 F3d 732, 789 (Boggs,J., dissenting) ("[TJhe nature and benefits
of the experiential 'diversity' that the Law School claims ultimately to seek is conceptually
disconnected from the racial and ethnic diversity that it primarily seeks.") (emphasis in
original); Bunzel, supra note 3, at 507 ("[T]here is wide disagreement over whether more
racial diversity, and therefore race preferences in admissions, is the fairest or most efficient
way to achieve increased viewpoint diversity."); Carcieri, supra note 105, at 134 (explaining
how the Law School's limitation of preferences to African Americans, Latinos, and Native
Americans is a "both over- and under-inclusive means of obtaining diversity of experi-
ence."); Note, An Evidentiary Framework for Diversity as a Compelling Interest in Higher
Education, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1357, 1366-69 (1996) [hereinafter, "Evidentiary Framework"]
(providing a concise summary of how race associates with experience).
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committee could draw. The system would require faith that applicants
were sharing viewpoints honestly held, and the assumption that students
even have clearly developed views in the first place. At an extreme, view-
points of matriculated students would need to be monitored over time,
and students would risk being dismissed if their viewpoints changed.'
2'
The second reason why the Law School uses race as a proxy for
viewpoint is that, given that all viewpoints are equally valid under the
First Amendment, 22 a genuine solicitation of representative viewpoints
would require the school to grant a preference even to marginal opinions,
even to viewpoints it hates. 123 After all, if the Law School wishes to en-
hance the education it provides by exposing students to a broad array of
viewpoints, excluding any particular viewpoint might be counterproduc-
tive. Instead, the Law School chooses to grant preferences only with an
eye extremely sensitive to race. The Grutter Court, in looking the other
way, hastily abandoned its own, broad diversity requirement.
C. Inconsistent Definitions of "Critical Mass"
The Law School enrolls a "critical mass" of minority students to
avoid subjecting them to stigma, and to diminish stereotypes of a "minor-
ity viewpoint.!' 121 Unfortunately, "critical mass" seems impossible to define
concretely without resort to any poisonous "quota." The Court, relying
on testimony by Law School Dean Jeffrey Lehman, defined "critical mass"
as "numbers such that underrepresented minority students do not feel
isolated or like spokespersons for their race."' 2 However, making "critical
mass" depend on the feelings of underrepresented minorities requires that
the definition be variable. A solitary but extraordinarily strong-willed mi-
nority person may constitute critical mass at one institution, where
critical mass might require 1,000 weaker-willed persons on another cam-
pus. The Education Brief also uses the term "critical mass" non-
definitively: "[W]hen an institution such as the Law School has acted to
admit a critical mass of minority students, it also strives to admit enough
students to represent varied viewpoints and perspective within underrepre-
121. See Carcieri, supra note 105, at 136 ("This is the wild goose chase and social
engineering nightmare to which [the University of Michigan's] claim to seek viewpoint
diversity logically leads.").
122. E.g., R.A.V v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377,430-31 (1992).
123. Yale College, for instance, recently admitted a former Taliban diplomat to a non-
degree special student program, and was considering his application to a regular degree
program at the time this Note was published. This decision has been the source of much
controversy. See generally Chip Brown, The Freshnian, N.Y.TIMES MAG., Feb. 26, 2006, at 55.
124. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 320 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert., at 215a). Notice the
assumption that some non-minority students believe all minorities share identical views.
Lauriat, supra note 107, at 1198.
125. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318-19.
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sented groups"' 2 6 This is an important point, but there is no evidence that
the Law School is actually working to ensure that within-group view-
point diversity is attained.
Exacerbating the impossible ambiguity is the fact that the mass that
is critical apparently varies by minority. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Grutter
dissent points to data from 1995 to 2000 showing tight correspondence
between a given race's representation in the Law School's applicant and
admittance pools.,The percentages of African American applicants and
admittances differed on average by only 0.4% each year; percentages of
Hispanics differed by 0.5%; and percentages of Native Americans differed
by 0.3%. However, the absolute number of these admitted minorities dif-
fered greatly across the groups: an average of 100 African Americans, 52
Hispanics, and only 15 Native Americans were admitted per year. 127 If a
"critical mass" of a particular minority is required for students to appreci-
ate that minority's viewpoint(s) without stigma, one would expect equal-
sized "critical masses" for each race, rather than mapping onto propor-
tional representation in the broader culture.' 28 It makes no sense that only
15 Native Americans are enough to defeat stigma, while 52 Hispanics and
100 African Americans are needed for the same effect.
129
1
D. Mismeasurement of the Dependent Variable, "Educational Benefit"
1. Questionable "Benefits"
Proponents of the diversity rationale claim that diversity improves
such intangible markers of achievement as cognitive development, creativ-
ity, study habits, attitudes and beliefs, and the capacities to understand and
appreciate others' perspectives. 3 Unfortunately, these outcomes are not
objectively measurable like standardized test scores or grades, so they in-
evitably require assumptions by researchers as to what constitutes a
valuable educational benefit. Indeed, by focusing on intangible
126. Education Brief, supra note 68, at 25.
127. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 383-84 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (Tables 1, 2, and 3).
128. George, supra note 27, at 1638-39.
129. See Peter Kirsanow, Michigan Impossible, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (July 1, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-Kirsanow07OlO3.asp (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
130. Education Brief, supra note 68, at 11 (citing Supplemental Expert Report of
Patricia Y Gurin, Grutter v. Bollinger, No. 97-75928 (E.D. Mich. 2001)) (arguing that
objective criteria such as grades, GRE scores, and graduate school admissions fail to ex-
plore "active, complex thinking or intellectual engagement"; that few meaningful
comparisons can be made between students by using such measures; and that such meas-
ures fail to demonstrate improvement over baseline knowledge); Hallinan, supra note 36, at
740-41.
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educational outcomes, the diversity theory assures its own incompatibility
with empiricism, and asks the Court for its faith.
Subjective measures of achievement pervade Gurin's research. For
example, students self-rated their abilities compared to the average person
their age; their aspirations in the areas of motivation, citizenship, and en-
gagement; and their growth since college. 131 Such measures are entirely
relative and suffer from the self-report bias described below.'32 Other
measures seem impossibly vague, included primarily as buzzwords. For
instance, the Education Brief identifies "civic preparedness" as the central
mission of higher education; 33 but it would be difficult to find even two
educators or politicians who would agree as to what such preparedness
would entail.
Finally, it is questionable whether some outcomes, if genuinely pro-
duced by diversity, are actually beneficial. Too often, the research in the
Education Brief focuses on impact, not benefit. For instance, the Michigan
and Harvard Law Schools study asked students whether they thought
their discussions with diverse peers would "impact" the legal and com-
munity issues they would encounter as professionals, 3 4  with no
identification of whether such impact would steer students toward more,
or less, multicultural involvement. Impact is not synonymous with benefit,
nor are "benefits" universal commodities to all intended beneficiaries. For
instance, "preparing students for a global marketplace" would seem of
greater consequence to a would-be businessman or diplomat than a
would-be physicist or poet.
Sometimes, what is portrayed as a benefit may be framed otherwise.
For example, in the MSS study, the percentage of White students with at
least one close non-White friend increased from 32% to 46% during their
time at Michigan, and the proportion of Black students with at least one
close non-Black friend increased from 47% to 54%. While these increases
may properly be deemed benefits, is it not troubling that about half of all
students lacked a single different-raced friend after a full four years in a
diverse student body? Delving further, only 29% of White students and
25% of Black students said they "shared personal feelings and problems"
with students of the other race; 23% of Black students said their relation-
ships with White students were "guarded and cautious," and 15% felt they
were "tense, somewhat hostile."' 31 Suddenly, interracial relationships at
Michigan appear much more strained.
131. Gurin, supra note 70, app. C and 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 380-82.
132. See infra Part IV.D.2.
133. Education Brief, supra note 68, at 12.
134. Id. at 20.
135. Gurin, supra note 70, app. E.
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2. Reliance on Self-Reported Data
Gurin's research, the research in The Shape of the River, and most
university studies of the diversity rationale, all suffer from self-report bias.
Whenever data are collected by survey, there is a chance that respondents'
self-reported beliefs may not match what they truly believe, and that sub-
jects may answer in a way they believe the researcher desires. Self-report
bias may be conscious or mindless. A student may report greater enthusi-
asm for diversity than he genuinely feels, deliberately trying to portray
himself as enlightened to the researcher (and to himself). Thus, some of
the 56% ofWhites in Bowen and Bok's 1989 cohort who reported know-
ing well at least two Black persons 136 may have answered dishonestly,
wishing not to appear racist. Or a student at a diverse university may im-
plicitly defend diversity more strongly than a student at a homogenous
university, trying to reconcile her "commitment" to diversity with her
prior choice to attend a diverse school. 37 Even a meticulously honest par-
ticipant might unconsciously adjust her interpretation of what it means to
know a person "well" if she regards herself as person who should be
friends with different-raced people.
All of Gurin's research for the Education Brief relied on self-
reported data. The Education Brief defends her use of self-assessments as a
credible and widely accepted practice, 38 and Gurin herself notes that self-
reports of learning outcomes are correlated with traditional measures of
achievement, including GRE scores and faculty's reports of student
growth. 139 Again, however, such objective measures do not speak to the
way diversity is theorized to benefit education, and even a very high cor-
relation--say, 0.7-would still leave unexplained over half the variance in
each variable. 40 Are we willing to tolerate such doubt in the articulation
of a compelling interest justifying discrimination that would otherwise be
unconstitutional?
136. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
137. The theory of cognitive dissonance suggests that, contrary to the traditional
theory that attitudes dictate behavior, a person may also change her attitudes to corre-
spond to her behavior, akin to a rationalization. See generally LEON FESTINGER,A THEORY OF
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
138. Education Brief, supra note 68, at 13.
139. Gurin, supra note 70, app. C (citations omitted).
140. The square of a correlation r between two variables indicates the proportion of
variation in one variable that can be predicted or "explained" by values of the other vari-
able. Supposing (generously) that GRE scores correlate 0.7 with an abstract variable like
self-reported appreciation of diverse viewpoints, the self-report measure could still only
predict less than half (0.7' = 0.49 = 49%) of the variance in GRE scores.
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E. Invalidity
1. Internal Invalidity: The Inability To Infer Causation
Research on the educational effects of diversity relies on a technique
called linear regression, used to analyze the relationships between inde-
pendent variable "inputs" and outcome variables, after controlling for
other variables known or expected to bias the relationship(s) of interest.
Researchers never actually manipulate any measure of diversity; to do so
might be unethical and, perhaps, impossible. As a result, all of the research
is correlational, and correlation never implies causation. Even if research
could show a perfect correspondence (correlation = 1) between the pro-
portion of minority students in a school and students' academic
achievement, it is logically impossible to infer that diversity is causing the
achievement. A third variable-e.g., monetary resources-may explain
both effects, "buying" both diversity (through the ability to offer scholar-
ships and recruit from a larger geographic area) and achievement (through
better teachers, textbooks, computers, and enrichment programs).
141
In her review, Hallinan is not blind to the problem: "[W]hile these
survey analyses are consistent in demonstrating a desegregation effect,
they do not identify the mechanisms that explain the observed relation-
ship." 142 She tries to fill the deficiency by referencing a handful of case
studies that she claims "provide some insights into the social processes
involved. These studies show that peer influence, role modeling, instruc-
tional quality, and educational expectations are factors that transmit the
effects of desegregation to student achievement."' 4 3 Gurin was similarly
searching for causal mechanisms by undertaking the IGRCC case study.
For whatever advantage case studies yield in suggesting potential causal
mechanisms, the great cost is the inability to generalize the findings from
case studies beyond their narrow circumstances.
The "gold standard" of social scientific research is the randomized,
controlled experiment, which permits a researcher to infer causality.
When subjects are randomly assigned to treatment and control conditions,
one can assume probabilistic equivalence between the conditions, in
terms of the background traits that subjects bring into the experiment;
thus, any observed effect can validly be attributed to manipulations of the
independent variable. However, when subjects are not randomly assigned
to conditions, for instance, by choosing their own conditions by choosing
to enroll at particular universities, the research is vulnerable to self-
selection bias. Thus, we cannot determine whether an observed outcome
141. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
142. Hallinan, supra note 36, at 744. Of course, her use of the word "effect" itself




is produced by the independent variable of interest, or by the preexisting
traits subjects brought to the study.
144
When a study is controlled, so only the independent variable is al-
lowed to vary between conditions, one can safely conclude that observed
effects were caused by the independent variable, not by a covariate. How-
ever, when "life"-the ultimate covariate-is in no way controlled during
the study, it is impossible for a researcher to isolate any effect caused by
student body diversity.We see this in the IGRCC and in Hallinan's coop-
erative learning program, where one cannot determine whether students'
academic achievements upon exiting the program were due to the diver-
sity of their peers, to the sheer strength of cooperative learning, or simply
to students' maturation over the course of the programs.
Cause and effect are often blurred. Consider six variables from the
CIRP study: "Discussed racial issues;" "Attend a racial/cultural awareness
workshop;" "Socialized with someone from a different racial/ethnic
group; "Number of six closest friends in college who were of respon-
dent's race/ethnicity;" "Extent of involvement at Michigan with groups
and activities reflecting other cultural/ethnic backgrounds;" and "Number
of five multiethnic campus events attended.1'" These measures might be
regarded as "benefits" of diversity. That is, we might hope that a person
exposed to more diverse students would be more inclined to socialize
with other-race students, to discuss racial issues with them, to consider
them close friends, and to develop an interest in multiethnic issues. Yet,
these were the six measures of interactional diversity that Gurin employed
as explanatory ("independent") variables in her models. Where a host of
variables are measured simultaneously, it is impossible to gauge which
variables are explaining which other variables, or if there is even any ex-
planatory power in the first place. Until some condition is introduced to
one randomized group, and not to the other, any exposure effects cannot
be inferred.
I discovered only one randomized, controlled study of the effects of
diversity on education outcomes. 46 The authors randomly assigned 357
White college students to small-group discussions, consisting of three sub-
jects and one research collaborator. 123 subjects were in groups where the
collaborator disagreed with everyone, 108 were in groups where the col-
laborator agreed with everyone, and the remaining 126 were in mixed
groups.14 7 The collaborator was either Black or White. Students wrote
144. See infra Part IVEL.
145. Gurin, supra note 70, app. C.
146. Anthony L. Antonio et al., Effects of Racial Diversity on Complex Thinking in Col-
lege Students, 15 PSYCHOL. Sci. 507 (2004).
147. Id. at 508. Unfortunately, 31 different collaborators were used, meaning that a
subject's discussion experience may have been impacted not just by her group's agree-
ment/disagreement and racial composition, but also by the particular characteristics of her
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essays on a social issue after participating in the discussion groups, and
judges rated those essays for "integrative complexity.
''4 8
Judges rated students' essays higher when the students had partici-
pated in a group where the collaborator held a minority opinion. In other
words, students who were exposed to more diverse viewpoints in their
discussion groups demonstrated greater assimilation of those views in
their post-discussion essays. The finding is dubious, however, because the
researchers did not control for pre-discussion integrative complexity. That
is, they did not examine growth in integrative complexity from pre- to
post-discussion. Still, even if one generously accepts that exposure to di-
verse viewpoints did lead to greater integrative complexity, one should
still be alarmed by a second finding, that the collaborator's race was utterly
unrelated to integrative complexity, either directly or by interacting with
viewpoint. That is, even if diverse viewpoints produced an educational
benefit, race served no proxy function with respect to viewpoint.' To the
extent that university affirmative action policies grant racial preferences
and not viewpoint preferences, the only experimental test in the literature
demonstrates that the policies will produce no educational benefit.5
Another difficulty plagues the ability to discover genuine educa-
tional benefits of diversity. Because exposure to diversity must occur over
some reasonably long time period in order to exert its theorized effect,
diversity studies are typically conducted over many years. A time effect is
always an alternative explanation for a program effect in a longitudinal
study. During the time a program is being administered, other social vari-
ables change. 1985, when the CIRP study freshmen were first surveyed,
was arguably a very different time than 1989, when they were surveyed as
seniors, or 1994, when they were surveyed five years out of school.'' The
1980s and 1990s saw a large increase in diversity on college campuses.152
collaborator, or the tenor and atmosphere the collaborator created for the group.The exis-
tence of this confounding variable makes even this experiment somewhat invalid.
148. "Integrative complexity" referred to cognitive styles that involve "differentiation
and integration of multiple perspectives." Id. at 508. Judges' ratings of the essays were only
moderately reliable, Cronbach's a = 0.62.
149. See supra, Part IVB.
150. The Antonio et al. study suffered from three other methodological and explana-
tory flaws worth footnoting. First, it is difficult to generalize the impact of viewpoint
diversity from a single, brief interaction in the laboratory to the many, unquantifiable in-
teractions a student will have across a four-year college career. Second, students apparently
were not told to write their essays with "integrative complexity." Thus, some students who
"got the point" of the experiment may purposefully have tried to integrate multiple
viewpoints into their essays, where students ignorant to the purpose may not have con-
sciously made such effort. Finally, ratings of integrative complexity were very low
throughout all conditions, the highest mean rating in a condition being 1.91 on a seven-
point scale. Such a restricted range suggests that the ratings were unreliable and invalid.
151. Gurin, supra note 70, app. C.
152. Total minority enrollment at the nation's colleges and universities increased by
122% from 1981 to 2001. WILLIAM B. HAmvEy, MINORITIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION 2002-
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The CIRP students were exposed not to a constant level of diversity, but
to increasing heterogeneity over the course of the study. Some partici-
pants may, consequently, have mistaken their university's appreciation of
diversity partly for their own, or at least had greater opportunity to be-
come sensitive and responsive to diversity. In addition to the admissions
trend, in the middle of the CIRP study, there was significant political ac-
tivity relevant to affirmative action and campus diversity, including
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.53 The Act, by strengthening
existing civil rights laws, may have provided a symbol rallying positive
attitudes--or suppressing negative attitudes-toward diversity.
2. External Invalidity: The Inability to Generalize
A goal of most social science-certainly of research intended to bol-
ster a purportedly compelling interest justifying racial discrimination-is
to generalize the findings from the participants in any one study to a
whole population. For instance, Bowen and Bok found that 70% of Black
students in their sample claimed it was important to work effectively with
other-race people.1 14 To what extent can they conclude that 70% of Blacks
at all colleges practicing affirmative action will feel similarly? They can
only infer this general conclusion from the limited data before them, their
precision corresponding to the probability threshold of their inferential
statistical test.
One's willingness to forgive potential errors of inference should di-
minish to the extent that a researcher's sample does not appropriately
model the relevant population from which the sample was drawn. Bowen
and Bok's student sample provided a poor model of the population of
schools practicing affirmative action. They studied 24 private schools but
only four public schools, all of them "elite" and selective. But most af-
firmative action takes place at public institutions, " 1 5 most of which are
middle-tier, and some lower-tier, by statistical necessity. Moreover, only
affirmative action in public schools (i.e., involving state action) is con-
tested on equal protection grounds, so the focus on private schools is
misplaced. The Shape of the River is not entirely relevant; that is, valid.
Gurin's research also lacks external validity. The MSS study was con-
ducted only with Black and White students, impairing her ability to
generalize the results to groups other than these two races, and ignoring
2003: TWENTIETH ANNUAL STATUS REPORT 4-5 (American Council on Education 2003)
(analyzing data from the Department of Education's National Center for Education Statis-
tics, the U.S. Census Bureau, and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).
153. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 29, 42
U.S.C.).
154. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 49, at 220-21.
155. Michael A. Olivas, The Shape of the Class, 24 REv. HIGHER EDUC. 193, 195
(2001).
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the infinite other varieties of diversity that the rationale purports to in-
corporate. Similarly, all three of Gurin's studies-the CIRP, MSS, and
IGRCC-used college student samples; yet, in Grutter, they were used to
defend an affirmative action policy at Michigan Law School. There are
many reasons why diversity may play a different role in an undergraduate
versus law school community. Undergraduate education is typically broad,
and exposure to diverse viewpoints may be more critical for students in
certain majors (like political science) than to those in other majors (like
mathematics). In contrast, a legal education is narrow, intimately tied to
policy, and arguably depends more on exposure to diverse viewpoints
than undergraduate education. At the same time, a law student is older
and presumptively more mature; exposure to diverse viewpoints may be
less critical than it is to an undergraduate's comparatively formative years.
Finally, law students are probably more likely than undergraduates to have
a job or family, or to live and dine off campus, indicating that legal educa-
tion is less of a life immersion experience than undergraduate education,
decreasing the frequency and value of a law student's exposure to diverse
peers.
In sum, invalidity is a criticism that can be made of all social science.
No study can be completely valid, either internally or externally. This is
because, within a single experiment, it is impossible to guard against all
potentially confounding variables, and no sample and procedure can per-
fectly model a population in real life. Insofar as all social science research




In a number of studies, the researchers' sample selection was biased.
In the CIRP study, Gurin excluded from her analyses historically Black
colleges, as well as community colleges. At such schools, Gurin "believe[d]
that both campus diversity issues and educational processes differ dramati-
cally from those found at predominantly white four-year colleges and
universities. 1 16 She never explains how issues and processes might differ;
but by excluding historically Black colleges, she dismissed a potentially
valuable control group. Her comparisons of racially heterogeneous and
homogenously White schools seem to test only the educational effects of
diversity on Wites-are Whites sincerely the beneficiaries of interest?
The exclusion of community colleges from her analyses is less suspect,
although the exclusion does limit the generality of her findings.
156. Gurin, supra note 70, app. C. Granted, the defendants in Grutter and Gratz were a
predominantly White three-year law school and four-year college.
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A more destructive selection bias in diversity research is self-
selection. Self-selection bias occurs when participants in a study sort
themselves into conditions, destroying the randomization that is so valu-
able to empirical analysis. When participants self-select into conditions,
they risk bringing to these conditions systematic differences that remain
with them through the period of analysis, ultimately distorting measure-
ment of the outcome variables. The bias manifests itself in a variety of
ways.
Unfortunately, every survey study comparing students at different
schools suffers from self-selection bias, because students choose the
schools to which they apply and ultimately attend. For example, if a re-
searcher finds that students at a historically liberal, diverse university
choose jobs in urban locations more frequently than do students at a his-
torically conservative, homogenous university, one possible explanation is
that students exposed to greater diversity in college seek similar work-
place diversity after graduating, a positive effect of campus diversity.
However, a more plausible explanation is that students at the liberal uni-
versity had a pre-existing fondness for diversity before coming to college.
The same value they place on diversity prompted them to 1) come to the
liberal, diverse university; and 2) choose a diverse urban work force after
college. The students who chose the conservative, homogenous university
never valued diversity, neither in coming to college nor in pursuing a ca-
reer. Crediting the universities for creating these differences is too
generous.
Conclusions produced by self-selection often sound trivial and self-
evident. For instance, Gurin observes, "Students who had taken the most
diversity courses and interacted the most with diverse peers during col-
lege had the most cross-racial interactions five years after leaving
college."'5 7 Of course they did. They specifically chose to take "diversity"
courses and chose diverse friends during college; it would be odd if they
suddenly abandoned pursuing diverse relationships after they graduated.
Indeed, many of their "cross-racial" friends after college were probably the
same "diverse peers" they associated with in college. Equally unsurprising
is the finding that 95% of students in the IGRCC study who were im-
pacted by diverse viewpoints in their coursework said that impact was
positive.' 8 The sample consists of students who, at the beginning of their
freshmen years, chose to enter a course on intergroup relations. They were
purely self-selected, and to suggest that the IGRCC Program taught them
to value diversity is absurd.
Other examples abound. In the Michigan and Harvard Law Schools
study,'5 9 the students praising diversity for enhancing their educational
157. Gurin, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 409.
158. See supra note 81.
159. Orfield & Whitla, supra note 83.
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experiences were the same students who chose to attend law schools
whose admissions policies advertised their commitment to obtaining a
diverse student body.'6 Many of these students valued diversity already.
Further, the 81% of Michigan and Harvard students who volunteered
their time to respond to the survey are unlikely random. Probably, they
are a self-selected subgroup having stronger opinions than average about
the importance of campus diversity. To the extent that their responses do
not reflect those of their entire schools, let alone law students generally,
the study is invalid.
By this same reasoning, it is unsurprising that Bowen and Bok, in
The Shape of the River, found that 70% of Black students and 63% of
White students agreed it was important to work effectively with members
of the other race, where those students were sampled from 28 "elite" col-
leges and universities embracive of diversity, as evidenced by their strong
affirmative action policies.' 6' Again, the findings were survey-generated,
meaning that not only was the selection of schools biased, but so too was
the sampling of students within the schools. Where a survey is voluntary,
the students with the strongest opinions on diversity are most likely to
participate.
Finally, in one review, Deborah Merritt observes:
For both minority and white students, attending a more selec-
tive college is associated with higher graduation rates and
greater earning power. Indeed, African American students who
attend selective colleges through affirmative action programs
are more likely to graduate from college, obtain advanced de-
grees, and secure high earnings than are African Americans
with similar SAT scores who attend less selective institutions.
Thus, minority students capitalize on the opportunities af-
firmative action programs offer them.6 2
Here, it is difficult to separate an institutional effect from self-selection.
The correlations between college selectivity and graduation rate, graduate
work, and income potential are unsurprising. Selective colleges would like
to explain the correlation as a product of the institutions, but it would be
foolish to ignore the fact that what selective colleges select are higher
quality, better able and better motivated students.
A half-hearted defense against self-selection bias is statistical control.
For instance, when Gurin assessed growth in learning and democracy
outcomes related to diversity experiences, she controlled for differences
across individuals in their initial positions on learning and democracy
160. After all, one of those schools went so far as to defend its affirmative action
policy to the Supreme Court.
161. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
162. Merritt, supra note 24, at 1063 (citations omitted).
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variables, as well as their relative likelihood to be drawn to intensive di-
versity experiences. In the IGRCC study, she statistically matched
students who did and did not have a "diversity experience.'' 163 The me-
chanics of statistical control are beyond the scope of this Note, but the
purpose is simply to employ statistical adjustments to "equalize" partici-
pants across a host of background variables, attempting to isolate the
educational effect directly attributable to diversity; that is, to determine
whether classroom and interactional diversity provide any additional ex-
planatory power beyond that explained by background differences. The
result, Gurin explains, is a "less biased view of the relationship between
campus diversity and student outcomes. 16 4
Of course, it is impossible to perfectly "match" or "equalize" any
two students, to control for all possible background variables. Without
random selection of students, combined with random assignment of stu-
dents to research groups-highly unethical in the admissions context-
statistical control will always be imperfect, and the best a researcher can
hope for is, indeed, "less" bias. Even if students' backgrounds could be sta-
tistically equalized, growth in one student might mean something
different from growth in another. Suppose that in comparing two stu-
dents' numbers of other-race friends at the end of college, we employ a
primitive statistical control by subtracting the number of other-race
friends those students had at the beginning of college, thereby controlling
for the baseline number of other-race friends. If Student A began college
with nine other-race friends and left with ten, and Student B entered col-
lege with zero other-race friends but left with one, after applying our
statistical control we would discover that the students "grew" equally by
one friend. However, it takes an odd set of assumptions to deem this equal
numerical growth as subjectively identical. Student A probably entered
and left college the same: tolerant and appreciative of diverse friends. One
can imagine circumstances whereby Student B's growth was much
greater, if, for instance, he were racist or had never met a person of a dif-
ferent race before entering college, but became so open to diversity
during college that he now calls a different-race person his best friend.
2. Differential Mortality
Another difficulty with longitudinal designs is differential mortality.
Whenever subjects are measured at different points in time, there is a risk
that some subjects will drop out of the study. In the current context, stu-
dents completing a first survey may then drop out of school, take a leave
of absence, or simply withdraw from participating in the study before a
second survey can be administered. Differential mortality is usually not a
163. Gurin, supra note 70, app. C.
164. Id. (emphasis added).
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problem if participants in different conditions drop out at approximately
the same rate. However, it becomes a problem when the rates of drop-out
are correlated with conditions in the study, or with a third variable of in-
terest.
For example, suppose I track the change in grade point average
across the college careers of White students who have taken an ethnic
studies course (Group A), versus those who have never taken such a
course (Group B). My study finds that students in Group A averaged a
0.5-point GPA increase over the four years, and students in Group B av-
eraged a 0.3-point GPA decrease. One possible explanation is that
enrollment in an ethnic studies course somehow enhances academic
performance across a student's college career. However, another very dif-
ferent explanation is possible.
Suppose also that 10% of students in Group A dropped out of col-
lege during the four years of my study, versus only 2% of students in
Group B. Consider what types of students are likely to drop out of col-
lege. A variety of causes are plausible, but one obvious candidate is a
student performing so poorly as to risk failing out of school.When a stu-
dent in a longitudinal study drops out of school, he drops out of the study
as well. Those participants who remain in the study share something
unique: they are able to perform well enough to remain in school with-
out interruption. That is, they have adequate, if not high grade point
averages. 16 The fact that 10% of Group A students dropped out of school
versus only 2% of Group B students might mean that those students re-
maining in Group A are more "refined" than those remaining in Group B.
While all of A's borderline students may have dropped out, many of B's
borderline students may still be "hanging in there," bringing down the
whole group's GPA. Then, the condition of enrollment in an ethnic stud-
ies course would be unlikely to explain the GPA difference.
Unfortunately, none of the longitudinal studies reported by either
Gurin or Hallinan even discuss mortality rates, let alone examine system-
atic differences between students who completed the study and those
who did not.
3. Sample Size and Statistical Power
Statistical power is the odds that a researcher will observe an effect
in her particular sample, given that a genuine effect exists in the general
population. If there is a real difference between the achievements of stu-
dents educated in more versus less diverse student bodies, a powerful test
using a given sample of students would be likely to detect the difference.
Generally, a study is thought to provide a good test if it has power above




0.80 (i.e., if there is an 80% chance the test will detect a genuine differ-
ence).
Power is related to sample size. The more people a researcher sam-
ples, the better the sample approximates the population at large, allowing
researchers to make better inferences regarding that population. Suppose I
wish to test verbal GRE scores of Black college seniors educated at ma-
jority-White versus minority-White universities. Suppose Black students
at a given majority-White school genuinely score a mean of 600, and
Black students at a given minority-White school genuinely score a mean
of 500. In order to have an 80% chance of detecting the difference be-
tween Black students' scores at the two schools, I would need a sample of
only 17 students from each school. 66 However, if the mean score of Black
students at the minority-White school is actually 510 (meaning the true
difference between students at the two schools is smaller), I would need
to sample 21 students at each school to have the same 80% chance of de-
tecting the genuine difference. If the mean of students at the minority-
White school is 570 (meaning the true difference is now down to 30, still
quite large), I would need a full 175 students at each school to maintain
the same power.
One can see how studies performed with large sample sizes can be-
come quite misleading. In a sense, a study can become too powerful,
making a big deal out of a small difference. In the above example, sam-
pling 1,570 students from each school would lead to the conclusion that a
mean verbal GRE score of 600 is significantly different from a mean score
of 590-although these scores are only one increment apart on the GRE
scale. As another example, with 3,529 students at each school, a difference
between a mean IQ of 100 versus a mean IQ of 99 would be judged sig-
nificantly different.'
6 7
3,529 students per school (7,058 students total) sounds like a tre-
mendous amount, and it is more students than attend many universities.
However, the CIRP study, so central to Gurin's analyses, used over 9,300
students. ' 8 Dividing this sample in two to make a pairwise comparison
between equal samples of 4,650 students would permit the conclusions
that a mean IQ difference of 7/8 of one point, or a mean verbal GRE
difference of 5.5 points, are statistically significant. Here, statistical
166. This calculation assumes a conventional 95% confidence interval (i.e., a prob-
ability < .05 threshold for statistical significance), and a standard deviation of 100 points
for each group (the standard for which the GRE aims). Several internet sites permit you
to perform power analyses. See, e.g., http://calculators.stat.ucla.edu/powercalc/ (last visited
Jan. 25, 2006).
167. This calculation assumes a conventional 95% confidence interval and a standard
deviation of 15 points for each group (the standard that always applies to the normal dis-
tribution of IQ).
168. Gurin, 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 380.
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significance, often an important metric, has become entirely divorced
from practical significance.
The problem is certainly not confined to the CIRP study.1 69 Most
research regarding the educational benefits of diversity and affirmative
action has used large, multi-institutional samples. Of course, once you
have come close to testing every student at a given school, your descriptive
generalizations about students at that school will be presumptively accu-
rate. The confusion arises in generalizing comparisons between schools.
When tests of large samples are reduced to pairwise comparisons, they
risk being too powerful, unfairly stacking the cards to make small differ-
ences seem important.
G. Experimenter Bias
Part and parcel to self-report bias7 ° is the possibility that an experi-
menter-again, consciously or unconsciously-may elicit particular
responses from the participants in her study. To discuss experimenter bias
is not necessarily to impeach an experimenter's motives or ethics. Still, a
fundamental tenet of social science research is that an experimenter
should have no personal stake in the outcomes; that she should be neutral,
not an advocate. It should cause some alarm, then, that Gurin was the
Psychology Department Chair at the University of Michigan-the Grutter
and Gratz defendant-and she conducted the research specifically for
those litigations. The Court, if it is to consider social science at all, should
at least establish an admissibility threshold requiring that a study be per-
formed by a researcher neutral to the litigation before the Court."'
H. Required Time Limit for a Purportedly Permanent Educational Benefit
Another gap in the diversity logic concerns Justice O'Connor's
prophecy that "25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no
longer be necessary to further the interest approved today," a prediction
169. Even the MSS study of students solely from Michigan had a "sample" size of
1,321. Id.
170. See supra, Part IVD.2.
171. Crystal Muhammad identifies some risks that self-interested research might
pose:
[Researchers] may be pressured by their personal ideology, concern for
populations at risk, or stakeholders to generate desired results. The implica-
tion is that applied studies are generally not as valued as pure research. In
addition, given the pressures of litigation in particular, courts tend to give
greater credence to studies conducted outside of the context of litigation
than projects ensued in the wake of litigation.
Muhammad, supra note 20, at 25 n.35 (citations omitted).
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stemming from the requirement that "race-conscious admissions policies
must be limited in time.''7 2 However, if diversity is theoretically linked to
educational benefits, it should continue to be linked forever.17 3 O'Connor
apparently hopes that a critical mass of all races will soon be achieved by
accident, without considering race. Such an accident would require that
the Black-White standardized test score gap 174 disappear, that currently
preferred minorities continue to apply in sufficient numbers to maintain
their representation, and that different-race students become, on average,
indistinguishable on paper. But then, race would no longer be relevant to
education, contradicting the very foundation of the diversity rationale.
7
In the alternative, if diversity's benefit is durable, quota-like percentage
sensitivity is inescapable, as is the acceptance that even Whites might be-
come a preference group if campus demographics dictated the need.
I. Diverse but Segregated
The Education Brief defends the use of enrollment in an ethnic
studies course as a diversity measure, arguing that, from overall member-
ship in ethnic studies courses, one can abstract a university structure
supportive of diversity.7 6 Indeed, Gurin never argues that an institution's
overall structural diversity should have a direct impact on education out-
comes:
Structural diversity is essential, but, by itself, usually not suffi-
cient to produce substantial benefits; in addition to being
together on the same campus, students from diverse back-
grounds must also learn about each other in the courses they
take and in informal interaction outside of the classroom. For
172. Gutter, 539 U.S. at 342-43.
173. E.g., Gratz, 122 F Supp. 2d at 824 ("[U]nlike the remedial setting, where the
need for remedial action terminates once the effects of past discrimination have been
eradicated, the need for diversity lives on perpetually"); Lauriat, supra note 107, at 1191
("Unlike remedial measures addressing past discrimination, the diversity rationale would
allow racial classifications to be used for an indefinite period of time, as long as an institu-
tion wished to assemble its student body along racial lines and dismisses race neutral
alternatives after 'serious, good faith consideration.' " (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339)).
174. See generally CHRISTOPHER JENCKS & MEREDITH PHILLIPS, THE BLACK-WHITE TEST
ScoRE GAP (1998) (collection of chapters by authors who, in regard to White students'
documented superiority over Black students' vocabulary, reading, and mathematics stan-
dardized test scores, offer a range of explanations for the score gap-from genetics to
environment to test bias--and explore how and why the gap has narrowed over time).
175. An alternative end to affirmative action might come when "race is no longer a
powerful influence on individual experiences (or is no longer sufficiently salient that its
inclusion in education furthers learning)." Evidentiary Framework, supra note 120, at 1364.
176. Education Brief, supra note 68, at 9. Note how this argument confounds a sup-
portive university structure with a causal hypothesis centered upon individual students.
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new learning to occur, institutions of higher education have to
make appropriate use of structural diversity.17
But the compelling interest articulated in Grutter derives exclusively
from an overall diverse student body. Now we are told that a diverse stu-
dent body, by itself, is insufficient; that a university must also successfully
manipulate that diversity, once numerically achieved, in order to realize
any educational benefit. In short, Gurin's model requires a mediated rela-
tionship,17 8 but the Court's reasoning does not. Thus, the diversity interest
sustained by the Court contradicts the very evidence used to articulate
the interest in the first place.
If the benefits of exposure to diverse viewpoints are real, then ad-
mitting a diverse class is not enough. The university should ensure that
those diverse persons actually interact. A university's assertions that diver-
sity promotes cross-cultural understanding, defeats stereotypes, and
enriches one's education all suffer if the college provides, sponsors, or
condones separate minority housing, student groups, orientation pro-
grams, or employer recruitment events.19 Further, a university allowing
students to liberally choose their courses will sacrifice some of diversity's
supposed benefit whenever race correlates with course selection. At a uni-
versity where, accidentally, all Black students major in humanities and all
White students major in science, no Black student might ever share a class
with a White student, yet the university could call itself "diverse." Grutter
allows schools to stop trying once they have achieved mere quantitative
diversity, and does not mandate "more meaningful, real equality that
would require understanding, and rejecting dominance in favor of true
egalitarian pluralism."'
80
I conclude this section the same way I began, with an observation
by Paul Brest:
These views [about the benefits of diversity] are based on my
experience as a professor and dean at Stanford Law School ...
While they are supported by some empirical studies, one would
177. Id. at 10 (quoting Supplemental Expert Report of PatriciaY Gurin, Grutter v.
Bollinger, No. 97-75928 (E.D. Mich. 2001)).
178. Id. at 10 (" '[A] large body of social science research show[s] that institutional
variables [such as structural diversity] have their effects on individual level variables [such
as positive educational outcomes] through other mechanisms.' ") (quoting EwART A.C.
THoMAs & JCHARD J. SHAVELSON, ANALYSIS OF REPORT OF WOOD & SHERMAN, ADDENDUM
TO NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SCHOLARS AMICuS BRIEF, available at http://siher.stanford.edu).
179. See Bunzel, supra note 3, at 493 (citing INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL
CHANGE, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA BERKELEY, DIVERSITY PROJECT (1991));JOHN H. BUN-
ZEL, RACE RELATIONS ON CAMPUS: STANFORD STUDENTS SPEAK (1992) (describing how
Black Stanford University students in the early 1970s sought a haven from "white Stan-
ford," and White students believed Blacks were "separating themselves in unhealthy
ways").
180. Dowd et al., supra note 62, at 38.
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have to concede that the evidence to date is largely impressionistic....
[M]any educators believe that diversity is educationally valu-
able. But the evidence is impressionistic and the conclusions
are speculative, or perhaps just hopeful .... The state of empiri-
cal knowledge about the educational benefits of diversity belies
any claim of necessity.18
Brest's awareness (and humility) is rare on both sides of the impas-
sioned debate over a continuing role for affirmative action in university
admissions. He is able to separate his own theory about the value of class-
room diversity from an honest assessment that the proven link between
diversity and educational benefit is thin. It is possible, of course, to value
diversity oneself, but still recognize that one's own values are not "com-
pelling."
CONCLUSION
In Grutter, a Supreme Court majority authoritatively proclaimed
what Justice Powell alone declared in Bakke: that racial diversity produces
substantial educational benefits warranting racial preferences in public
university admissions. In this Note I have shown how social science has
not-indeed, cannot-prove that student body diversity produces these
benefits. And I have argued that, where the diversity rationale cannot be
proven, it likewise cannot be compelling.
It is possible the Grutter Court was using the diversity rationale as a
subterfuge for retaining, in a qualified sense, affirmative action policies the
Court finds desirable but has rejected on other grounds, including as a
remedy for prior discrimination in society. 82 At best, such action is a use-
ful fiction, sociologically supporting what everyone "knows" anecdotally
to be just. 18 3 This approach did not seem dangerous before Grutter, when
courts rarely relied on social science evidence in desegregation litiga-
tion."" However, when social science becomes central to a court's
reasoning, as in Grutter, one might reasonably suspect that such evidence is
181. Brest, supra note 101, at 685,690-91 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
182. See supra notes 3-4, 11-12 and accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., Charles Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J.
421, 423-24, 426 (1960) (calling the lawfulness of the Supreme Court's segregation deci-
sions "subjectively obvious", a "matter of common notoriety", and part of the
"background knowledge of educated men"; responding with "laughter" to naysayers who
would suggest that segregation does not offend equality; and arguing that Court decisions
to the contrary would be "law based on self-induced blindness, on flagrant contradiction
of known fact.").
184. Muhammad, supra note 20, at 2 (finding, in a review of 28 federal court deseg-
regation decisions involving 38 judges, no significant relationship between case outcomes
and the quality of social science evidence presented, and observing that social science only
plays a role for cases and judges at the margin).
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being used as a cover to lend an appearance of objectivity to a decision
made on normative grounds, to dart political controversy. James Ryan has
found, "[I]f judges perceive an issue as involving moral or philosophical
judgments, as opposed to pragmatic or instrumental ones, they are less
likely to rely heavily on social science evidence to resolve the issue.
18 5
The Grutter Court deviated from this approach.
Let us be honest: affirmative action is a fundamentally moral policy.
If affirmative action is legal, it is legal because equal protection permits,
maybe demands, that the gatekeepers of national power and wealth ac-
knowledge and correct for their own past discriminatory actions, and that
they grant future access to power and wealth to persons who might oth-
erwise be excluded.186 The diversity rationale, in contrast, is a purely
functional justification, conspicuously lacking the moral component. It is
a consolation prize.
"It is hard to be an enemy of diversity. Most Americans recognize
diversity as one of the nation's proudest attributes."1 87 I agree: diversity is a
morally justified goal. Still, I disagree that diversity is an educationally jus-
tified means. 8" This latter claim remains only a "hypothesis in search of
proof."'8 9 In summary, then, this Note can fairly be characterized as a re-
sponse to the following:
The benefits of diversity are the result of interpersonal interac-
tions that cannot be quantified or verified by scientific proof.
185. Ryan, supra note 27, at 1662-63.
186. See generally Lawrence III, Two Views of the River, supra note 4 (lamenting the
amoral aspect of the diversity rationale, in contrast to more radical arguments focusing on
the need to remedy past discrimination or address present discriminatory practices; and
arguing that the diversity rationale, rather than counteract traditional notions of merit that
serve to perpetuate race and class privilege, actually facilitates the reproduction of elites).
187. Bunzel, supra note 3, at 498.
188. This distinction was understood by scholars attending conferences held by the
Harvard Civil Rights Project following the Hopwood decision, where the lack of solid
evidence to promote the case for diversity was addressed: "Legal experts poked ... holes in
other pieces of research, disheartening some of the academics in attendance, who were
confronted with the need to justify a concept they believe in implicitly." Douglas Leder-
man, Backers of Affirmative Action Seek Research To Bolster Cause: At Meeting at Harvard,
Sympathetic Lawyers Tell Scholars That Their Work Will not Sway Many Judges, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC., May 23, 1997, at A28.
189. Bunzel, supra note 3, at 503. Bunzel continues:
I am prepared, therefore, to entertain two thoughts simultaneously: 1) admit-
ting students from different geographical regions, races, and social
backgrounds is a desirable goal and a university's public responsibility, but 2)
diversity of viewpoints in the classroom comes principally from intellectual
effort on the part of students and professors working together to explore
ideas, test arguments, and question assumptions, with one's race or ethnicity




Such benefits do not accrue every day to every student and
may even go undetected by the students and participants in-
volved. Therefore, a university would face insurmountable
obstacles if it had to 'prove' the benefits of diversity using cur-
rent methodologies.... Rather than preventing universities
from seeking the educational benefits of diversity, courts
should find the testimony of educators sufficient to establish
these benefits.... [A] university should not be required to
make a particularized showing that diversity furthers learning
at its institution.90
I am unwilling to excuse a lack of evidence and simply trust the
word of educators. A Court that accepts ignorance and faith as a substitute
for principle and proof is irresponsible. After all, "[W]e must never forget,
that it is a constitution we are expounding."1 9'
190. Evidentiary Framework, supra note 120, at 1361-62 (citations omitted). For cri-
tique of this argument, see Thomas E. Wood & Malcolm J. Sherman, Is Campus Racial
Diversity Correlated with Educational Benefits?, in NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SCHOLARS, RACE
AND HIGHER EDUCATION: WHY JUSTICE POWELL'S DIVERSITY RATIONALE FOR RACIAL
PREFERENCES IN HIGHER EDUCATION MUST BE REJECTED (2001), available at http://www.
nas.org/rhe.pdf.
191. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,407 (1819).
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